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INTRODUCTION

In Latin America change has taken place at an unprecedented
pace during the last decades. Countries in the region have witnessed an active process of trade liberalization and modernization
* The author is LSU Law Visiting Global Scholar. He is also a Visiting Professor
at Universidad Cat6lica Argentina and Universidade Agostinho Neto de Angola.
Professor Reyes is a former Superintendent of Corporations for the Republic of
Colombia. He is the author of seven books, including most recently Derecho Societario
en Estados Unidos, Introducci6n comparada, Legis, 2006; Derecho Societario, Vols. I
and II, Temis, 2006, and Transformaci6n, Fusi6n y Escisi6n de Sociedades, Temis,
2000.
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of their economic institutions. The benefits arising from multinational free trade agreements with the United States,1 the European Union 2 and other nations may be a determinant factor for
economic development in the area. Insertion in a globalized framework may also allow local businesses to access the international
securities market. In order for this process to be successful, a parallel adjustment of the legal infrastructure will have to be completed. The existence of an appropriate juridical framework has
been identified as a crucial element, without which the benefits of
free trade could be hindered.4 Regulatory efforts aimed at facilitating commerce, surpassing bureaucratic obstacles and attenuating
a paternalistic culture of legal formalities will be significant challenges in the near future for most Latin American nations.5 Furthermore, local codes, statutes and business practices will have to
be updated according to recent legal developments achieved in
various parts of the world.'
1. At the end of 2005, Peru executed a Trade Promotion Agreement with the
United States. Colombia also entered into a similar bilateral treaty in 2006. The
latter treaty remains to be ratified. See Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S. - Peru,
Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade.Agreements/Bilateral/PeruTPA/Final_
Texts/SectionIndex.html; Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S. - Col., Nov. 22, 2006,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/ColombiaFTA/FinalText/Section_
Index.html.
2. Chile and the European Union entered into an agreement that regulates
cooperation between them regard to political, commercial, economic, financial,
scientific, technological, social and cultural matters. Agreement Establishing an
Association, Art. II, E.U. - Chile, Nov. 18, 2002, http:www.sice.oas.orglTrade/chieu_e/
chieule.asp.
3. This ongoing process of modernization of the legal infrastructure began at
least two decades ago. See generally Antonio Mendes, Update on Laws Affecting
Trade, 7 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 1, 1-46 (1992) (describing the changes in Brazilian Law in

the late 1980's and the subsequent effects on the economy).
4. "Throughout Latin America, law reform is in the air. After decades of neglect,
Latin American legal systems are experiencing substantial if not drastic processes of
reform and transformation .

. .

. These reform processes respond to global and

domestic actors and pressures." Joseph R. Thome, Heading South But Looking North:
Globilization and Law Reform in Latin America, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 691, 691 (2000).
5. For example, in Mexico "there is a strong predilection in favor of adherence to
formalities in commercial contracting." STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAw 534
(2004).
6. Some authors consider that this adaptation process may contribute to
improving a country's economic perspectives. "[I]f earnings are limited and financial
resources considered insufficient to attain the desired growth rate, the challenge is to
find domestic and international sources of capital. This often implies that governance
practices have to be adapted to meet the demands of outside sources of finance,
without sacrificing the benefits of the alignment of ownership and defined control."
Heloisa B. Bedicks & M. Cecilia Arruda, Business Ethics and Corporate Governance
in Latin America, 44 Bus. & Soc'Y. 218, 219 (2005), available at http://bas.sagepub.
com/cgi/content/abstract/44/2/218.
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Even if globalization offers significant opportunities for developing countries including the gains arising from broader market
access, it creates an interdependence that is usually linked with
regulatory homogeneity.7 A problem associated with globalization
relates to the indiscriminate imposition of international models
and schemes for convergence. In some cases, this process takes
place without regard to diversity and local traditions.' The
increasing presence of international agencies specialized in providing consulting services relating to the convergence of legal
institutions may prove challenging. The frequent lack of an appropriate process of adaptation to the economic and cultural realities
of the recipient country may very well determine the failure of any
legal transplant. Such importation of rules of a foreign origin has
already taken place in the field of corporations and more specifically in the subject of corporate governance.
The problems associated with legal transplants are well
known in Comparative Law. Alan Watson analyses the basic factors that determine the failure or success of a legal transplant,
which include, inter alia, language proximities, proper adaptation
of relevant statutes, as well as historic and political relationships
between the borrower and the lender.9 An indispensable process of
adaptation encompasses the quest for a common language aimed
at determining mutual grounds for understanding between heter7. This has been the path followed in the European Union, where the issuance of
directives has allowed for the harmonization of several fields of the law, including
company law. "A series of Directives has the general aim of harmonization of the
company laws of the Member States." M.C. OLIVER & ENID A. MARSHALL, COMPANY
LAW 5 (1994). The need for certain harmonization is evident in light of the worldwide
dimension of securities markets. "The distinction between local and international
financial markets becomes blurred when we consider that firms in a country can issue
securities abroad and when international investors can buy shares issued by local
firms, either directly or via American depository receipts (ADR)." Fernando Lefort &
Eduardo Walker, The Past and the Future of Domestic FinancialMarkets in Latin
America, http://www.frbatlanta.org/econ-rd/larg/events/conf2001/walker-lefort_
paper.pdf.
8. A new trend in cooperation for development embodies the idea that its
effectiveness will depend on there being a sense of national policy ownership. Ocampo
notes that such a principle has won formal acceptance as a guideline by several
cooperation institutions including the OECD. Nevertheless, "quite frequently, it is
ignored in practice. Indeed, an effort is often made to 'compel' ownership of the
policies that international agencies feel are appropriate." GLOBALIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT,

A

LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE

133 (Jos6 Antonio

Ocampo & Juan Martin eds., Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean 2003).
9. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAw

23 (2d ed. 1993) (analyzing the historic and political relationships between the
borrowers and lenders of legal transplants).
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ogeneous legal institutions. The difficult apprehension of such a
language implies the use of a functional equivalent, namely, an
intelligible translation of notions, which transcends the literal
meaning of words and expressions. ° Mary Ann Glendon is explicit
in regards to the dangers that stem out of simplistic comparisons.
According to this author, legal provisions cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of their political, social and economic purposes. A mere comparison of legal rules may be
misleading when it relates to different legal systems subject to
conflicting procedural rules and dissimilar legal classifications. 1
Prominent authors go as far as considering that it is unfeasible to import rules from a system pertaining to the Common Law
tradition into a Civil Law system, due to an assumed lack of compatibility between them. In this regard, Eduardo Favier-Dubois
holds that certain Latin American social, religious and cultural
values are antagonistic to those prevailing in Common Law jurisdictions. The author further states that a legal institution that
works properly within the individualistic and protestant philosophy will not be equally useful in countries characterized by a gregarious and cooperative behavior. The obvious conclusion of this
somehow extreme doctrinal position is that a defensive attitude
vis-A-vis cultural globalization should require an affirmation of
local traditions as a means to preserve the national identity. 2
The Argentine professor Guillermo Cabanellas adopts a similar approach. According to his perception, there are multiple dangers and difficulties ensuing from foreign intellectual influences in
Latin American legal systems. Such a caveat is more relevant
10. FRANcisco REYES, DERECHO SOCIETARIO EN ESTADOS UNIDOS, INTRODUCCION
COMPARADA, (3d ed. 2006). According to Mary A. Glendon a functional approach

"means that legal rules and institutions at some point have to be liberated from the
conceptual categories of their home systems so that they can be seen in terms of the
social objectives they serve." MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADITIONS 12 (2d ed., 1994).
11. MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL

101 (1982).

12. Eduardo Favier-Dubois, Doctrina societaria y concursal, No. 181, Buenos
Aires, 2002, at 825. This opinion coincides with Linda 0. Smiddy's comparative
analysis on the influence of culture in corporate legal reform in France, in what
appears to be cultural differences between Latin and Anglo-Saxon communities.
According to this author, a study based on a survey of 15,000 business managers
working for companies in Western and Asian industrialized countries showed two
very different views of a business corporation. "Americans valued individual
opportunity, achievement, and individual qualifications as being more important
than group cohesiveness. The French, in contrast, tended to emphasize
communitarian concerns." Linda 0. Smiddy, Corporate Reform in France: The
Influence of Culture, 27 VT. L. REV. 879, 881 (2003).
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when the influence comes from a wrongful interpretation of U.S.
legal materials rather than from the construction of continental
European statutes and texts. The author emphasizes on problems
arising out of translations of complex terminology, lack of conceptual equivalences and structural differences among the concerned
systems. "
It is thus clear that an appropriate process of adaptation to
the economic and social realities of the recipient country is a
determining factor for the success of legal transplants. The importation of rules and regulations is obviously facilitated if both countries -lender and borrower- belong to the same legal tradition. In
the case of Latin America, there has been dependency on the codification system in vogue in nineteenth-century continental
Europe. This fact has resulted in a continued reliance on the
evolution of the French and Spanish legislations. 14 Such dependency is still significant today in various fields of Private Law. I"
Nonetheless, the economic importance of the U.S. as well as the
practical nature of its legal institutions has determined an undeniable global influence in most fields of the law. Even European
13. FRANCISCO

REYES, DERECHO SOCIETARIO EN ESTADOS UNIDOS, INTRODUCCI6N

3 (3d ed. 2006) (preface by Guillermo Cabanellas de las Cuevas). A
similar approach is exemplified by the adoption of Americanized Corporate Law
statutes in Russia. That country's new legislation provides an example of the
problems associated with trans-cultural reform. "Russia's current corporate code was
heavily influenced by U.S. law. It was apparently not significantly based on Russian's
legal tradition and culture. In addition, at the time it was drafted, Russia's legal and
financial institutions did not provide the necessary support for the law. Consequently,
in Russia, an innovative and very modem corporate code reportedly languishes in the
statute books. The lesson to be learned from the Russian experience is that as we look
to other countries for possible avenues of reform, we must consider what would be
effective in the context of U.S. history, culture and legal tradition." Smiddy, supra
note 12, at 886.
14. For an explanation regarding the codification movement in nineteenth-century
COMPARADA

Latin America see BORIS KozOLCHYK, LA CONTRATACI6N COMERCIAL EN EL DERECHO

COMPARADO 130-33 (2006). This author describes the so-called Latin American
codification family, which encompasses three master codes drafted by great jurists:
Dalmacio V6lez-Sdrsfield (1800-1875) for Argentina, Andr~s Bello (1781-1865) for
Chile, and Augusto Teixeira de Freitas (1816-1883) for Brazil. Id.
15. Regarding codification in Latin America see generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN
CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEMS 208-220 (1978). Schlesinger points out to the so-called exogenous

& DAVID S.

influence, which is particularly noticeable in instances in which legislators have
resorted to the wholesale importation of foreign law. "Most of the codes presently in
force in Latin America are the result of extensive comparative study and eclectic
choice among European models." RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW
11 (6th ed. 1998). Schlesinger also adds that this process involves the danger -evident
in Latin America- that foreign institutions may be copied without sufficient
adaptation to local conditions. Id. at n. 32.
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scholars have acknowledged this situation. Pierre Mousseron, for
instance, has held that the so-called globalization ("mondialisachosen to designate an
tion") of Corporate Law is the expression
16
americanizationof this field of the law.
This pressure has been increasingly acknowledged in Latin
America during the last century. 7 In fact, according to Matthew
Mirow, the most important change for Latin American Private
Law has been a turning away from the European doctrinal
approaches to indigenous materials or even to legal literature proceeding from Common Law countries.'" Mirow's assertion in
regards to the movement from European to American sources is
evidenced through a study carried out in various Latin American
countries.19
The adoption of U.S. models in Latin American law can be
justified by multiple explanations, which range from the simple
cost-efficient motivation to the more complex perception of legitimacy that is granted to a new legislation if it has been copied from
a prestigious legal system.2 ° It follows that nations in political
16. PIERRE MOUSSERON, DROIT DES SOCI2T S 22 (Montchrestien 2d ed. 2005). The
author lists the causes of such americanization.In his opinion, they resemble the ones
that propelled the expansion of Roman Law. The language is the first among them.
English has become the common vehicle for business law. This circumstance fosters
the Anglo-Saxon legal model to the extent that terminology does not need to be
translated and therefore altered upon exportation. The universities are the second
cause. Very much like the journeys that French jurists made to Ancient Rome, legal
studies in the Anglo-Saxon world are of a paramount importance today. They
constitute the basic credential required to access a legal practice in the field of
international business transactions. A last cause relates to the affiliation of local law
offices with Anglo-Saxon firms. Id. at 22-23. "Some [Latin American] countries have
begun to see a U.S. LL.M as a requisite to the elite firms that deal with international
and large national businesses." MATHEW C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORY
OF PRIVATE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 191 (2005). In regard to the
expansion of the Roman legal system, see generally H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL
TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 125-69 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the impact and process of
the spread of Roman law throughout Europe). "The Romans dominated, then the
national civilians dominated (so out went the chthonic ways), then the world became
a zone of influence of civil laws, as the colonization process occurred." Id. at 165.
17. For instance, according to Stephen Zamora Mexican Corporate Law not only
has borrowed from European laws, but owes much to U.S. influences. See ZAMOaA ET
AL. supra note 5, at 567.
18. "In addition to, and concurrent with, the prominence of the United States
models and influences, international investment in Latin America and the
globalization of legal practice have led to sidestepping domestic law and national legal
systems." Matthew C. Mirow, The Code Napoleon: Buried But Ruling in Latin
America, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 179, 187 (2005).
19. See MIROW, supra note 16, at 169.
20. Jonathan Miller depicts the differences existing among various types of legal
transplants. The following classes can be distinguished: (1) The cost-saving
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transformation seek prestigious models to give credibility to their
newly enacted statutes. According to Jonathan Miller, "most countries simply cannot engage in international commerce or expect
international investment without moving their legal regimes
toward common standards. .... ,
In spite of several difficulties arising from the adoption of foreign models, a certain degree of borrowing is necessary at least in
the fields related to business associations. More than fifty years
ago, Phanor Eder pointed out to the need for convergence in this
specific subject. Business Corporation Law is generally the same
throughout the world, due to the existence of the equal economic
phenomena and the presence of similar general concepts leading
to comparable results. However, Eder asserted that the higher
industrial and financial development of some countries would
determine that the barkward-looking ones would "tend to be
guided in their legislation by the more progressive nations and by
the views of their leading authorities. 2 2
Difficulties also arise from legal translations. The triumphal
arrival of the Common Law in Latin America is not less overwhelming than that of the very language in which it has
expressed itself since medieval times. The undisputable
supremacy of the English language in the academic scenario is an
aspect that must not be overlooked in the field of Comparative
Law. The establishment of this language as the new Lingua
Francais probably the single most significant contribution for the
propagation of the Common Law institutions in Continental
Europe and elsewhere. In the field of Private Law, this dissemination of Anglo-Saxon legal institutions is also linked to the preemitransplant: the motivation arises out of the need to reduce expenses and save time by
using a foreign model dealing with the same issues at hand; (2) The externally
dictated transplant: the incentive stems from a desire to please foreign states,
individuals or entities; (3) The transplant as a vehicle for individual investment: it is
motivated by the presence in the receiving country of individuals interested in the
transplanted legal structure so that they can obtain political or economic benefits; (4)
The legitimacy-generating transplant: the reason underlying the legal transplant is
the prestige of the foreign model. See Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal
Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the
Transplant Process 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 845-54 (2003). The prestige can be
predicated either of the specific legal institution or of the entire legal system. Miller
suggests that governments, foundations and international bodies encouraging legal
transplants need to consider their work in light of this typology in order to
understand how local dynamics interact with their own goals. See id. at 872.
21. Id. at 840.
22. Phanor Eder, Company Law in Latin America, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW 5, 5
(1951).
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nent scholar works of the so-called Law and Economics
movement.2 3
A well-known factor leading to the failure of legal transplants
arises from the lack of equivalent language and the frequent and
misleading existence of false synonyms.24 As Keith Rosenn has
noted, many English juridical terms, developed for Common Law
legal systems, have no Spanish equivalents because the same concepts do not exist within the Civil Law tradition. 2 "The similarity
of words disguises important differences in meaning, and these
differences have much to do with intangible aspects of the legal
culture.""
In the specific case of corporate governance the manner in
which this problem has been dealt with is both wrongful and striking. Experts in the field have been satisfied with the simplest literal translation that arises from the identical and common Latin
roots of the aforementioned two words. Therefore, the Spanish
expression gobierno corporativo and the Portuguese governanga
corporativaare widely used irrespective of their misleading meaning in both romance languages. The first aspect to consider is the
idea that the term corporationhas a different legal connotation in
countries of a Roman-Germanic tradition as compared to its counterpart in the Common Law world.27 The word corporaci6n -at
23. Textbooks like Economic Analysis of Law, by Richard Posner are widely
diffused in the Latin American academic community. An association for the diffusion
of Law and Economic methods was founded nearly a decade ago. ALACDE holds an
annual conference in which experts analyze legal institutions in light of functional
approaches. See ALACDE, http://www.kentlaw.edu/alacde/index-files/Pagel956.htm
(last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
24. Cf. Edgardo Rotman, The Inherent Problems of Legal Translation: Theoretical
Aspects, IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 187, 189 (1996). Apart from precision and
certainty, a legal translation "is bound to use abstractions, whose meanings derive
from particular changing cultural and social contexts. These contexts generate a
certain degree of ambiguity, which increases when the legal cultures and systems are
vastly different from each other." Id. Legal translation becomes a greater challenge
when the concerned terms come from ancient legal sources, subject to specific
historical developments. See Matthew. C. Mirow, Latin American Legal History: Some
Essential Spanish Terms, 12 LA RAZA L. J. 43, 44 (2001).
25. Keith Rosenn, Dahl's Law Dictionary, 24 INTER-AM. L. REV. 607, 607 (1993)
(reviewing

HENRY

S. DAHL, DICCIONARIO JURIDICO (1992)). The author further states

that "[elven when similar concepts exist in both languages, English and Spanish
juridical terms are often simply functional analogues whose meanings differ in
important ways." Id. at 608.
26. See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 77-78.

27. Corporation would be usually translated as sociedad or compafita. See Louis
A. ROBB, DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMS: SPANISH-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-SPANISH 151
(1991); see also JULIO ROMAPACH, TEACH YOURSELF... LEGAL SPANISH 308 (1999)
(defining the same words). But see PHANOR EDER, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF ANGLO-
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least in those Latin American legislations that follow the Andr~s
Bello Civil Code of 1855- relates, generally, to a non-profit entity
deprived of a lucrative purpose." The words that more closely
29
resemble that of the corporation would be sociedad or compaia.
On the other hand the word governance (gobierno or governanga),
has a specific technical meaning provided for under local doctrine.
Such meaning may not necessarily correspond to the one assigned
for the purposes of corporate governance. In the case of Argentine
Corporate Law, for instance, the term relates exclusively to the
legal issues concerning the shareholders' assembly. 0 An appropriate translation, following the most elemental rule of Comparative
Law should have to take into account functional equivalents for
both words. Although it is too late to change a widespread and
somehow practical terminology, a proposed technically neutral
translation into Spanish for Corporate Governance could be
organizaci6n societaria.
136 (1950) (claiming that there is "no possible
translation for the word sociedad"). This term and the ones given to the different
types of business organizations are challenging to translate. Keith Rosenn stresses
the complexities of such a task. The author criticizes the wrongful translation in
Dahl's Law Dictionary of the sociedad de responsabilidad limitada as a limited
partnership. More adequately, Rosenn holds that such business entity "is actually a
limited liability company whose capital is divided into quotas among a limited
number of quota-holders whose liability is limited to unpaid subscriptions for quotas.
It can be structured as either a corporation or partnership for U.S. tax purposes,
depending upon how the bylaws are drafted." Rosenn, supra note 25, at 613.
Conversely, Josd Ram6n Cano Rico in his trilingual Law Dictionary provides the
English meaning for the Spanish word "corporaci6n". Obviously, he proposes the
appropriate legal translation of association instead of the misleading word
corporation. JOSE RAMON CANO RICo, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO, EsPANOL-INGLUSFRANC S 46 (1994).
AMERICAN AND LATIN-AMERICAN LAW

28. See COD. Civ. art. 641 (Col. 1873); COD. Civ. art. 545 (Chile 1996); COD. Civ.
art. 19 (Venez. 1942); see also ARTURO VALENCIA ZEA & ALVARO ORTIZ MONSALVE,
DERECHO CIVIL, Vol I (1994) (discussing Colombian civil law); Alfredo Morles
Herndndez, CuRso DE DERECHO MERCANTIL Vol. II, (4th ed. 1999) (discussing
Venezuelan civil law); ARTURO ALESSANDRI RODRIGUEZ ET AL., TRATADO DE DERECHO

CIVIL (7th ed., 2005). In regards to the importance of the great nineteenth century
codifier Andrds Bello, it has been said that "he was the father of fifteen children."
Matthew. C. Mirow, Individual Experience in Legal Change: Exploring a Neglected
Factorin Nineteenth-century Latin American Codification, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM.
301, 301 (2005).
29. Hannon warns about the inaccuracy incurred when the term corporate is
identified with Latin American sociedades. It cannot be suggested that Latin
American "'corporate' or 'corporation' law deals with the specific equivalence of the
corporation in Latin America." Paul. B. Hannon, Latin American CorporationLaw, 34
TuL. L.REV. 733, 753 n. 35 (1960).
30. See generally 4 GUILLERMO CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, Los Organos
Societarios, in DERECHO SOCIETARIO, PARTE GENERAL, 141-204 (Buenos Aires Heliasta
ed., 1993); RICARDO A. NISSEN, CURSO DE DERECHO SOCIETARIO 437 (1998).
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Notwithstanding terminology discrepancies as the ones illustrated before, a significant degree of borrowing and harmonization
in the field of Corporate Law in Latin America is as practical as it
is necessary. 1 The lack of an appropriate comparison with more
advanced jurisdictions has left behind most of the legal systems of
Latin America. The legal framework in these countries is clearly
underdeveloped as compared to the more progressive and updated
regimes of the world.3 2 Legal transplants in the field of Corporate
Law have already taken place in Latin America during the last
decades. It is foreseeable that the influence of foreign regulations
in the region's Corporate Laws will be further increased. Yet, as it
has been suggested, a special caution must be placed in this prospective importation of institutions.
The pace at which borrowing in Corporate Governance has
taken place is both impressive and problematic. The hasty worldwide diffusion of the recent American legislation -propelled by
broadly publicized scandals of local corporations-, has left neither
room nor time to carefully assess the practical implications of such
a complex body of rules in foreign territories. Even in the U.S. it is
still too early for scholars to properly evaluate the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act promulgated by Congress in 200 1. Its practical implications
as a deterrent of inappropriate Corporate Governance practices
31. "The last century saw, in federal states, like the United States and in supranational organizations, like the European Union, serious consideration given to the
replacement of the current system of corporate regulation with national or supranational corporate laws." LARRY CATA BACKER, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAw, UNITED
STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, CHINA AND JAPAN 543 (2002).
32. Some important authors apparently tend to classify Latin American Corporate
Laws within the same category that has been assigned to the African regulations in
the field. "Other systems of corporate governance are also worthy of study. The
governance systems of Latin America, the Indian subcontinent and Africa merit
discussion in their own right." Id. at xxxviii n.2. Another example of this
categorization can be inferred from the landmark publication The Anatomy of
Corporate Law written by Reiner R. Kraakman and six other reputed authors.
Notwithstanding the comparative and international approach adopted in this
important book, its explanations are concerned only with European, American and
Japanese Corporate Law. There is generally no reference to Latin American legal
systems in this fundamental work. See REINER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAw (2004) (discussing European, American and Japanese Corporate
Law, but not Latin American Corporate Law).
33. "It is early days for academic appraisals, but the ones that have been ventured
so far tend to the view that costs will exceed benefits. Meanwhile, many of America's
businessmen are deeply unhappy, and with reason: the initial costs of the new law
have been bigger than expected. And it can be argued that, when it comes to repairing
American corporate governance, the law anyway addresses symptoms more than
causes." A Price worth Paying? - Auditing Sarbanes-Oxley, THE ECONOMIST, May
19th, 2005, at 82.
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have not been fully verified. In fact, there is a frequent complaint
in regards to the costs associated to its implementation in corporations listed in U.S. stock exchanges. 4 If this is the status of empirical research in the U.S., the situation in Latin America is even
less promising. The impact of these measures has not been the
subject of substantive analysis. Generally speaking, countries in
the region have embraced the creed of corporate governance, without much regard to economic and cultural local conditions. Not to
mention the lack of a careful assessment concerning these new
rules' possible implications in terms of costly compliance with formalistic burdens.
The consequences of imitating foreign legislations in this field
cannot be determined at this premature juncture. Nonetheless, it
can be foreseen that certain corporations will be deterred from
listing their securities in stock exchanges due to the expenses
associated to such burdensome regulations. However, the overwhelming reality of Corporate Governance as a worldwide phenomenon cannot be ignored. The influence of proposals such as
those prepared by international organizations has changed the
Corporate Law landscape at least as it relates to the field of listed
corporations. It is also true that the implementation of these general proposals can still be subject to a process of adaptation to
local realities. Such process should be carried out at the same pace
at which legal transplants are being made in this subject.

II.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)", defines corporate governance as "the relationships
between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and
34. John Berlau has held that although Sarbanes-Oxley "was sold as a cure for
Enron-like corporate misbehavior, the law mostly fails to target the real wrongdoers
and instead punishes all public companies as a class.... [Ilt is innocent small public
companies that are really paying an unfair price for Enron's sins." John Berlau &
Anastasia Uglova, Puts & Calls: Sarbanes-Oxley 'Reform' Harming Economy, PiTT.
POST-GAzETE, Nov. 13, 2005, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05317/

605320-28.stm.
35. "The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ('OECD') was
established on December 14, 1960 and is now comprised of thirty countries, including
the United States and much of Europe. The OECD considers itself 'a forum in which
governments work together to address the economic, social and environmental
challenges of interdependence and globalization.' Article 1 of the OECD Convention
states that its mission is 'to promote policies designed: ... to contribute to growth in
world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis.'" Kathryn Fugina, Merger
Control Review in the United States and the European Union: Working Toward
Conflict Resolution, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 471, 484 (2006).
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other stakeholders. Corporate governance provides the structure
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance
are determined."36
Even if the afore-quoted definition appears to be precise, it
must be recognized that there is no specific boundary for this
vague concept. 7 McCahery defines Corporate Governance as "the
monitoring and control over how the firm resources are allocated
and how relations within the firm are structured and managed.""
In this sense, it does more than regulating ownership and control
arrangements inside the firm. "It also contains rules that protect
other stakeholders like employees and creditors from moral hazard and adverse selection."3 9 Several corporate relationships are
included within the broad scope of this discipline. They include,
inter alia, the ones that stem from control relations amongst management, the board of directors, shareholders and other stakeholders such as the employees, suppliers, credit institutions, etc.4 °
Corporate governance arises not only of Corporate Law regulations, but can also be found in agreements entered into by contracting parties and by optional guidelines that can be adopted by
listed or non-listed corporations.
Corporate governance understood as a system to protect
external investor is as ancient as the medieval commenda. In
order to develop long-term relationships in medieval times, "disclosure and enforcement mechanisms were devised through a system of notaries, guilds and mercantile courts."4 ' The development
36.

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.

GOVERNANCE

IN

LATIN

AMERICA

(OECD),

WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE

58 (2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/2/

18976210.pdf.
37. "Changes in corporate governance cover a broad spectrum of issues: trying to
ensure better discipline by the domestic financial system, requiring enhanced
disclosure of financial transactions, adopting better rules for internal management of
corporations, and implementing better capital market regulation and supervision."
Stijn Claessens, Policy Approaches to Corporate Restructuring Around the World:
What Worked, What Failed? in CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM
EXPERIENCE 11, 55 (Michael Pomerleano & William Shaw eds., 2005).
38. Joseph A. McCahery & Eric P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance and
Innovation: Venture Capital, Joint Venture, and Family Businesses, 1 (European
Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 65, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.
conlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=894785 (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 12. McCahery describes this ancient institution and explains how "the
managerial agency problem and the corresponding governance concerns have existed
as long as investors have allowed others to use their money and act on their behalf in
risky business arrangements." Id. at 8.
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of the stock corporation characterized by centralized management,
limited liability, free transferability of shares and continuity of
existence gave rise to additional governance problems that today
are analyzed under the concept of agency costs. As early as 1776,
Adam Smith pointed out to the opportunistic behavior of directors
in stock corporations. "The directors of such joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money
than of their own, it cannot be well expected, that they should
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the
partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.
Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention
to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the
management of the affairs of such a company. "42
The modern Principles of Corporate Governance as well as
several other contemporary Corporate Law institutions can be
considered to be an American invention.43 In fact, the topic has
been analyzed in the US for nearly three decades. Already in 1978
the American Law Institute had undertaken the project entitled
"Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement
and Recommendations". The very first draft of the principles
started out from the recognition of the goals of Corporate Law in
regards to the objectives of the business corporation, namely, to
conduct business activities with a view to corporate profit and
shareholder gain. In furtherance of those goals, the principles proposed that the corporation, in the conduct of its business (a)
should be obliged to act within the boundaries set by law; (b) may
properly take into account ethical principles that are generally
recognized as relevant to the conduct of business," and (c) may
devote resources, within reasonable limits, to public welfare,
42.

AN INQUIRY INTo THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
326 (James E. Thorold Rogers ed., The Clarendon Press 1869).
43. Even the terminology to identify this topic has been borrowed -in some cases
wrongfully- by several civil law jurisdictions. This phenomenon is widespread not
only in Latin America but also in European countries. PIERRE MOUSSERON, DROIT DES
ADAM SMITH,

NATIONS

SocIAT9s 22 (Montchrestien 2d ed. 2005).
44. In asserting the importance of business ethics in the field of corporate
governance, Bedicks has addressed the usual lack of concern for discussing ethical

standards in some Latin American institutions. "In most meetings with Latin
American representatives of the corporate governance institutions, ethical principles
have rarely come up as a significant topic. Discussions usually revolve around capital
and ownership structure, the role and responsibilities of the board of directors, and
market situations." Bedicks & Arruda, supra note 6, at 226.
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humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic causes.45 The initial
draft addressed the duties of due care and loyalty as well as the
business judgment rule. Attention was also placed on the issues of
derivative actions and delegation of management functions in
publicly held corporations.48
The prominent evolution of this field is reflected in the influence that such body of principles has had in reshaping the corporate regulation throughout the world.47 The basic concern in
regards to corporate governance relates to the ability to shape a
regulatory structure that can foster risk taking, especially by
institutional investors and to promote start up companies with
innovative ideas. 48 Nobody disagrees as to the usefulness of corporate governance as a means to foster investment. According to
Embid Irujo, "a good corporate governance regime is crucial for an
efficient management of capital markets and the system of investment. At the same time, corporate governance insures that all
participants in the market take into account the broad range of
interests of a legal and economic nature in which those interests
evolve.. .. ""
Today, most countries acknowledge the need to incorporate
provisions regarding transparency and timely disclosure on the
part of directors and officers at least in publicly held firms. The
need to provide for auditing committees has also become a standard rule for those corporations willing to enter the competitive
international capital markets." Some financial institutions have
45.

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATMENT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1982).

46. See generally ROBERT HAMILTON, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 35 (West Publishing

Co. 1983) (discussing public corporations). More recent versions of the "Principles"
include a comprehensive treatment of the duties and responsibilities of directors and
officers of business corporations to both the corporations and their shareholders, the
objective and conduct of the business corporation, the structure of the corporation, the
duty of care and the business judgment rule, the duty of fair dealing, the role of
directors and shareholders in transactions in control and tender offers, and corporate
remedies. See also ALI, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.ppage&
nodeid=88.
47. "Spurred by a global emphasis on corporate governance, many countries in
recent years have been improving the rules on how corporations are monitored and
governed." Claessens, supra note 37, at 55.
48. See McCahery, supra note 38, at 1.
49. Jos2 MIGUEL EMBID IRUJO & DANIEL ROQUE VITOLO, SOCIEDAS COMERCIALES:
Los ADMINISTRADOS Y Los SoCIos, RESPONSABILIDAD EN SOCIEDADES ANONiMAS 18

(Rubinzal-Culzoni Editores 2003).
50. It is accurate to state that companies pursuing international investments
"must differentiate themselves by adopting stellar treatment of minority shareholders
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even developed methods to evaluate if a company complies with
minimum corporate governance standards.5' Complex formulae to
determine the probability of insider trading -an important variable of corporate governance- have also been proposed.5 2 Thus, it
has been determined that there is a clear correlation between the
development of capital markets and the nature of legal rules, provided that they can be effectively enforced.5 3 It has been held that
investors are willing to pay a premium for a well-governed company. In this sense, "corporate governance could be seen as a technology -similar to a manufacturing technique, an inventory
management system or an engineering economy of scale- and
firms face powerful incentives to adopt the best corporate technologies possible."5 4 The following figure shows that, at least in theory, Latin American investors are willing to pay an additional
amount of money per share if the issuing entity is diligently
managed.5
Average premium for "well governed" companies
Venezuela
Colombia
Brazil

28
27
23

that go beyond any country-specific minimum requirements. In order to attract
international investors, companies and their managements are not only required to
be strong from a financial standpoint, but also to act with transparency and in the
best interest of all of their shareholders; in other words, to exercise sound corporate
governance practices." Alex Brown, Latin America Strategy: Who has the Best
Corporate Governance in Latin America?, DEUTSCHE BANK, May 1, 2001, at 3.
51. For instance, the Deutsche Bank applies a method whereby companies are
ranked according to the following categories: 1. Shareholders' treatment (score range:
-14 to +50 points); 2. Management's independence (score range: -1 to +25 points); 3.
Information disclosure (score range: -2 to +20 points); 4. Dividend Policy (score range:
-4 to +10 points). Id.
52. Variables such as the informed trading probability (ITP) index are important
because "the expected probability that outside investors' wealth will be confiscated
through poor governance and informed trading is a crucial determinant of their
portfolio allocation and the ensuing cost of capital for the corporations trying to raise
it." Juan J. Cruces & Enrique Kawamura, Insider Trading and CorporateGovernance
in Latin America, 5 (Inter-American Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. R-513, 2005),
http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubR-513.pdf.
53. See generally, Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinantsof External Finance,
52 J. FIN. 1131, 1146 (1997).
54. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 135 (1999).
55. Because these results are based on a survey, a question remains as to the
practical behavior of investors in a given situation and the difficulty of defining the
concept of a "well-governed" company. The latter subject is one in which reasonable
minds could differ to a large extent.
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The specific aims of corporate governance relate to the
enhancement of transparency and disclosure, especially in listed
corporations, to improve the monitoring role and performance of
the boards of directors, to ensure independence of auditors and to
guarantee the autonomy of non-executive directors.56

III.

THE CONTEXT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BLOCKHOLDING VERSUS MARKET SYSTEMS

A basic example of intricate borrowing is given in the specific
context of business associations. Several aspects of corporate governance, which have been designed for publicly held corporations
operating in systems such as those in the US and the UK, tend to
be extrapolated to concentrated ownership structures like those
prevailing in Continental Europe and Latin America.57 The corresponding rules that are transplanted or recommended usually
deal with problems that arise in the context of significant ownership dispersion. Therefore, the underlying concern in such regulations relates to the need to ameliorate the discrepancy of interests
between those pursued by shareholders as opposed to managers.
The main focus of corporate governance rules that arise in this
context is aimed at an alignment of such interests. It is natural,
therefore, that most devices sought to deal with this particular
agency problem are oriented towards the granting of certain
appointment rights, the ability to vote in regards to major corporate decisions and the imposition on managers and directors of
liabilities arising from the breach of the duties of care and loyalty.5" These rights and remedies are useful even in those systems
in which there is no capital dispersion like the one existing in the
US and England. However, they do not suffice for the purpose of
56. See McCahery, supra note 38, at 2.
57. See for example Argentine Decree 677 of 2001, regarding transparency of
public offering of securities, Brazilian Law 10.303 of 2001, regarding publicly held
corporations and Colombian Law 964 of 2005.
58. According to Roberta Romano, the more prominent examples of devices
designed to mitigate agency problems ensuing from the dichotomy between ownership
and control are the following: "(1) shareholder elected boards of directors who monitor
managers, (2) shareholder voting rights for fundamental corporate changes, and (3)
fiduciary duties that impose liability on managers and directors who act negligently
or with divided loyalty favoring their own financial interest over that of
shareholders." ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 2 (The
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1993).
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dealing with corporate governance issues that arise in block-holding systems. The nature of most agency problems in the context of
ownership concentration differs to a large extent from those present in highly developed and liquid capital markets.
Lefort has pointed out that the very high level of ownership
concentration in the region implies that in Latin American firms,
corporate control is tightly exercised by majority shareholders.59
The author further states that as a result of such pattern of equity
ownership "the focus of corporate governance concern in the
region is possible divergence of interests between majority and
minority shareholders.""
Instead of addressing the agency problem derived from a conflict between majority and minority shareholders, the imported
principles tend to deal with the tension arising from shareholders
and directors.6 '
Vidal also describes this situation pursuant to the following
description: "Latin American companies, in contrast [to US publicly held firms] are characterized by a high concentration of ownership in the hands of a few controlling shareholders. In Latin
America, on average, the five largest shareholders of a company
own 80% of the company's shares."62 This description corresponds
to the so-called family control, namely, that in which members of a
single family hold a large block of stock.63 Therefore, these family
59. Coffee states that ownership concentration is such a widespread condition that
only a few systems allow for a clear separation between ownership and control.
"[C]ontemporary empirical evidence finds that, even at the level of the largest firms,
dispersed share ownership is a localized phenomenon, largely limited to the United
States and Great Britain." John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 641, 641 (1999).
60. See WHITE

PAPER,

supra note 36, at 48.

61. Pursuant to Kraakman, these conflicts form part of some of the agency
problems that exist in any business firm. They involve, on the one hand, the conflict
that exists between shareholders and directors and, on the other hand, the
antagonism that is present amongst shareholders possessing a controlling interest
and the minority owners. In the latest scenario "the non-controlling owners are the
principals and the controlling owners are the agents, and the difficulty lies in
assuring that the former are not expropriated by the latter." REINER KRAAKMAN ET
AL., supra note 32, at 22.
62.

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

IN LATIN

AMERICA:

BEYOND

SARBANES-OXLEY,

in

CLAVES DE GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO 129 (Confecdmaras, Bogoti 2005). This situation

has some correlation with the empirically demonstrated fact that "Latin America has
the most unequal income distribution in the world." Ocampo & Martin, supra note 8,
at 109.
63. Bedicks has in fact asserted that "[flamily control remains the norm for most
of the region's non-listed small- and medium- size enterprises." Bedicks, supra note 6,
at 218. Family control is considered to be one of the major obstacles for proper
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members will have the power to influences management policies
and even replace officers and directors, if necessary, with people to
their liking.'
Ocampo concurs with Vidal and provides an accurate description of the Latin American situation regarding corporate governance: "In this case, majority shareholders control the firm's board
of directors and management. The dispersion and varying interests of minority stakeholders, on the other hand, make it difficult
for them to organize themselves effectively. Good corporate governance seeks to prevent the shareholders that have a controlling
interest from obtaining a disproportionate share of profits or other
benefits relative to the size of their holdings."6 5
From a technical standpoint, the structure for corporate governance in the region could be accurately characterized as the socalled traditional model. It is based upon property rights, in which
shareholders who supply the capital become the major factor in
the governance process." This model coincides with the corporate
structure provided for under most Latin American statutes
regarding stock corporations (sociedades an6nimas). Pursuant to
these regulations, the shareholders meet at least once a year to
approve accounts of management and financial statements. In
that meeting a board of directors is elected and the shareholders
take care of any other general matters relating to the corporation's business ventures. The board intermediates between the
shareholders and the corporation's officers. The latter, once
corporate governance reform in Latin America. "Important objections to reform also
come from the families that control large corporations. From the point of view of these
families, an improvement in the rights of outside investors is first and foremost a
reduction in the value of control due to the deterioration of expropriation
opportunities. ....What the reformers see as protection of investors, the founding
families call 'expropriation of entrepreneurs.' No wonder, then that in all countries from Latin America to Asia to Europe- the families have opposed legal reform." Rafael
La Porta et al., Investor Protectionand CorporateGovernance, 58 J. OF FIN. ECON. 3,
18-19 (2000).
PUBLIC POLICY,
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND
64. ROGENE A. BUCHOLZ,
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGMENT AND STRATEGY 249 (Prentice Hall 1992). Mark J. Roe

provides an interesting characterization of this corporate governance structure:
"Well-to-do families in some nations are said to prefer family ownership of enterprise.
Firms are passed from generation to generation; corporate governance sometimes
becomes the governance of family relationships." Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063,
2073 (2001). The author further states that the preference of such structure has a
functional side, for shareholders in such family structures can keep more of the rents
inside that family than can another structure. Id.
65. Ocampo & Martin, supra note 8, at 137.
66. See Buchholz, supra note 64, at 243.
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appointed by the board, undertake the day-to-day management of
the corporation. The board also monitors the activity of officers
and other executives in order to protect the interest of
shareholders. 7
Table 1: Ownership Concentration in Latin America6
Country
Argentina

Sample
(2002)

% of the
largest
shareholder
(2002)

% of 3
largest
shareholders
(2002)

% of 5
largest
shareholders
(2002)
90%

15

61%

82%

Brazil

459

51%

65%

67%

Chile

260

55%

74%

80%

Colombia

74

44%

Mexico

27

52%

65%
73%

73%
81%

Peru

175

57%

78%

82%

Average

168.3

53%

73%

79%

The OECD recognizes the high degree of ownership concentration for listed companies in Latin America". It also acknowledges family control as the prevailing structure for non-listed
small and medium size concerns in this region. 70 Albeit trouble67. This description matches the definition given by Buchholz. Id.
68. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 53.
69. WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 9. Ownership concentration and non-listed
companies appear to be the general rule throughout Latin America. In Brazil, for
instance, only 120 of about 6,000 companies "are listed and regularly traded on the
Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa). Even some of the listed companies, however,
could be considered non-listed companies (NLCs). . . This is the case of some large
government controlled companies in the energy and financial industries, large familycontrolled groups and privatized companies under foreign control because of the small
amount of shares that are freely traded. From a corporate governance point of view,
these companies 'look and feel' like NLCs because boards of directors are appointed
essentially by controlling shareholders." Leonardo Viegas, Brazil: Corporate
Governance-Challenges and Opportunities, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NONLISTED COMPANIES IN EMERGING MARKETS 133 (Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development 2006).
70. WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 9. Bedicks and Arruda depict other regional
structural characteristics that were identified by the OECD:
* Privatization
* Concentration of ownership, defined control, and the need for
capital
* Importance of industrial groups
* Restructuring of banking systems
* Regionalization and the importance of multinational enterprises
• Limited domestic capital markets and growing importance of
foreign listings
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some in many aspects, equity blocks may also prove helpful in
terms of efficient monitoring of management.7 1 "Clearly identified
and actively-engaged majority shareholders can be a great
strength for a company by ensuring active oversight of management and by providing a ready source of financial support to the
company at critical junctures." 2 The International Finance Corporation (IFC) shares this approach and acknowledges the important aspects of majority or family ownership. 3 "Much of the global
corporate governance dialogue rightly focuses on managing conflicts between controlling shareholders and other stakeholders."
The IFC also concedes that, "it is also important to recognize the
benefits, in terms of stability and focus, that derive from having a
committed set of controlling shareholders at the heart of a
company."75
Even if the experiences in the US regarding the regulation of
publicly held corporations might be useful as a reference for legal
reform in Latin America, the significant structural differences
between these two disparate corporate realities shall be a
required point of departure. Whereas US Corporate Law and
Securities Regulations' main concern is to address the problem of
*

Mandatory privately managed pension scheme
* Legal traditions and enforcement.
Bedicks & Arruda, supra note 6, at 222.

71. See generally WHITE

PAPER,

supra note 36.

72. Id. at 9.
73. Family control is a straightforward fact in Latin America. Mexico, for instance,
"with a smaller economy and a political economy that stifled competition for many
decades, still shows a high concentration of economic power in several large extended
family empires (the Garza Sada family in Monterrey, the Slim and Servitje families in
Mexico City and others) that have had inordinate influence over particular sectors
because of their majority ownership of financial and industrial enterprises." ZjMoRA
ET AL,

supra note 5, at 536.

74. See generally International Finance Corporation, http://www.ifc.org (last
visited Feb. 17, 2008).
75. Id.
76. According to Troy A. Paredes, "the right corporate governance regime for a
country depends on its unique institutional makeup. In adopting a program of reform,
therefore, policymakers ultimately must be pragmatic, looking past ideals and
ideologies to what is possible and realistic. Even if the market-based corporate
governance model of the United States, with its enabling corporate law, is the most
effective system of governance for realizing the broadest and deepest securities
markets, the U.S. approach is not achievable everywhere." Troy A. Paredes, A
Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate
Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1155 (2004). The author has also
stressed the following: "[O]ne danger of transplanting U.S. corporate law to
developing economies is that it might not fit with the 'importing' country's economic
structure, political system, social order, or cultural values." Id. at 1058. "The bottom
line for most developing countries is that importing a corporate law regime along the
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opportunistic behavior on the part of directors and officers vis-hvis shareholders," the objective of Latin American regulations
should be the protection of minority shareholders against the risk
of expropriation by block-holders. 7s The absence of a separation

between ownership and control in Latin American corporations
imposes a necessary departure from applicable principles of corporate governance designed for market systems. 79 Accordingly, convergence in the field of best governance practices may prove
troublesome due to fully identified systemic differences. 80 Indeed,
lines of the U.S. model, or otherwise depending on a market-based model of
governance, is not a viable option." Id. at 1059.
77. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (The Macmillan Company rev. ed. 1967). Such

potential for abuse represents the basic agency problem in the U.S. publicly held
corporation. It is held that there is an information asymmetry, due to the superior
knowledge that managers have in regards to investment policies and the firm's
prospects. Therefore, "managers tend to be better informed, which allows them to
pursue their own goals without significant risk. Consequently, shareholders find it
difficult, due to their own limitations and priorities, to prompt managers to pursue
the objectives of the firm's owners." McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 38, at 6-7.
Such agency problem gives rise to opportunistic behavior on the part of management
regarding the following aspects: (1) Exorbitant compensations; (2) usurpation of
corporate opportunities; (3) Replacement resistance; (4) Resistance to profitable
liquidation or merger; (5) Excessive risk taking; (6) Self dealing transfer pricing and
(7) Power struggles between managers. See id.
78. The need to protect minority shareholders from expropriation by block-holders
is evident in Latin American markets. In fact, foreign investors in the region have
shifted from acquiring minority ownership in local companies, to investing in
controlling blocks. "Many of the first generation funds [that invested in Latin
America] were content with minority positions; more recently funds are clamoring for
at least a majority position. In cases where a majority position is not feasible,
investors are focusing on voting mechanisms and other methods of de facto control."
Alyssa A. Grikscheit, Private Equity in Latin America: Strategies for Success, http:/!
www.goodwinprocter.com/-/media/68D1941615F74EB8B4DO2C2EEAC69EF4.ashx.
There is no doubt that an effective control on majorities' conduct may also be
beneficial for the corporation itself and even for such controlling shareholders.
"[Legal constraints on the ability of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority
shareholders should reduce the cost of outside equity capital for the corporation."
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 22.
79. Vermeulen has asserted that until recent times "few academics or
policymakers even acknowledged the importance of creating effective measures for
closely held companies, let alone the need for improved institutions to stimulate social
welfare and economic growth. The problems of publicly held firms are not fully
present in closely held companies. The 'closely held versus public' dichotomy is a
useful classification system to explain the different kinds of incentive and governance
structures in play and, more importantly, it helps policymakers to rethink corporate
governance mechanisms and reforms." ERIK P.M. VERMEULEN, The Role of the Law in
Developing Efficient Corporate Frameworks, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF NONLISTED COMPANIES IN EMERGING MARKETS

93 (OECD Publishing 2006).

80. This opinion coincides with Vidal's view according to which, "the goal of
corporate governance regulations in Latin American countries is the protection of

228

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:2

local regulators in the area and international cooperation institutions should focus on the agency problem derived from the conflict
between majority and minority shareholders in order to adequately ameliorate self-dealing and potential reaping of private
benefits by block-holders."' Nevertheless, it appears that the basic
approach of convergence proposals generally deals with the tension between shareholders and directors. 2
From another perspective, it must be borne in mind that in
Latin America most of the business associations are incorporated
as closely held companies. 3 The securities markets in the region
tend to be small in comparison to those of developed market economies. Therefore, it must be recognized that the agency problem
underlying corporate governance in Latin America relates to a
large extent to conflicts between controlling shareholders and
their counterparts in limited liability companies and closely held
corporations. 84
minority public shareholders against any improper diversion of assets by controlling
shareholders." CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 62, at 130.
81. An adequate focus on such matters may contribute to the appropriate
development of liquid securities markets in emerging economies. In fact, "[ilnvestors
will be reluctant to invest if they are not confident that insiders will not expropriate
their investments by paying excessive compensation to executives, filling key
positions with friends and family, engaging in self-dealing transactions, trading on
inside information, shirking, or stealing. In other words, investors will withhold funds
if they are not adequately protected from agency problems." Paredes, supra note 76,
at 1062.
82. McCahery and Vermeulen conclude that corporate governance frameworks for
closely held corporations [such as the ones prevailing in Latin America] have failed to
address the main issues that may arise in these companies. According to the authors,
in closely held firms "[tihe focus shifts from the relationship between management
and shareholders to the relationship among several groups of shareholders. In this
view, an effective legal governance framework must offer mechanisms that serve to
protect shareholders from the misconduct by fellow shareholders." JOSEPH A.
MCCAHERY & ERIK P.M. VERMEULEN, Amsterdam Center for Corporate Finance,
TOPICS IN CORPORATE FINANCE: UNDERSTANDING (UN)INCORPORATED BusINEss FORMS

5 (2005), http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/events/06022701pdf/2-1-3-1lmccahery-vermeulen
paper l.pdf.
83. There are also a large number of limited liability companies, which resemble
the American statutory closely held corporations and LLC's. "Some of the forms of the
limited liability firm are interesting examples of hybridism. It ranges from a true
partnership to a form so closely resembling the corporation that it is practically
indistinguishable from it." Phanor J. Eder, Limited Liability Firms Abroad, 13 U.
PITT. L. REV. 193, 196 (1952).
84. "The agency problem underlying Code provisions for public corporations is also
less severe in the close corporation because ownership and control are typically not
severed. Concerns of close corporation shareholders involve instead conflicts between
majority and minority shareholders and between shareholder-managers and nonmanaging shareholders, as well as valuation problems for shareholders that arise
from the absence of a public market for shares." ROMANO, supra note 58, at 24.
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Another feature of the Latin American corporate legal structure that must not be underestimated for the purposes of a comparative law analysis is the codified nature of private law
institutions as opposed to the judicial decision making process of
their common law counterparts. Even in the presence of multiple
corporation law codes in the US, it has been appropriately held
that the basic protections for investors and minority shareholders,
in general, arise from the judge made law. According to Rudolf
Schlesinger, after the evolution of state legislation on corporations, "it became apparent, therefore, that the state statutes,
under which corporations are organized, could not afford sufficient
protection for shareholders and creditors. Such protection had to
be achieved outside of the corporation statutes, by courts of equity
imposing fiduciary duties upon management, and by the federal
securities legislation of the 1930's and 1940's. The result is that, in
contrast to the method traditionally followed in the civil-law
world, the most important legal devices used in this country for
the protection of investors are not built into the corporation statutes themselves, but exist as a separate body of law."85 Furthermore, certain authors point out to the rather evident finding
whereby, "only US law aggressively protects minority shareholders by emphasizing independent directors, direct voting rights,
and fiduciary duties."86
IV.

CORPORATE LAW STRUCTURE IN LATIN AMERICA

Following the Continental European tradition and particularly the French heritage of the Code Napoleon, 7 the long-stand85. SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 15, at 803. Regarding the usually limited
judicial function in Roman-Germanic systems, it has been said that, "[i]n civil law
systems, the role and influence of judicial precedent, at least until more recent times,
has been negligible." JAMES G. APPLE ET AL, A PRIMER ON THE CIL-LAW SYSTEM 36
(Federal Judicial Center 1995). On the other hand, it has been held that certain civil
law jurisdictions are shifting towards a more creative judicial function. "Although
traditional civil law dogma denied that judges 'make' law and that judicial decisions
can be a source of law, contemporary civil law systems are more and more openly
acknowledging the inescapable dependence of legislation on the judges and
administrators who interpret and apply it." GLENDON ET AL., supra note 10, at 63.
86. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 60.
87. Professor Matthew Mirow vigorously contests as simplistic a characterization
of the Latin American legal systems as essentially systems that are based on the
Napoleonic Code. See Mirrow, supra note 18, at 179. "Successful codifications of
private law were often exercises in comparative legislation. At the core of those
exercises were the Code Napoleon and the European commentary sources that quickly
grew around the main text. This however does not mean that Latin American
countries merely translated and borrowed the Code article by article." Id. at 183.
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ing dichotomy of private law still prevails in most Latin American
countries."s This legal duality is troublesome in the specific field of
contracts and corporations, due to the existence of a two-tier regulation for many private agreements.89 The assessment of the applicable substantive regime is usually difficult and often
characterized by subjective definitions.9 ° The problem associated
with the dichotomy of private law has been extensively addressed
by legal doctrine and jurisprudence. 91 The lack of solid objective
criteria to determine the civil or commercial nature of a business
corporation creates difficulties for the assessment of applicable
substantive law. This dichotomy is not necessarily reflected in
procedural rules. Thus, in many countries of the area there are no
differences between civil and commercial courts as there are in
their French counterpart. This difference makes the dichotomy
generally pointless here, for both civil and commercial processes
tend to be equally inefficient due to an absence of expeditious
rules of procedure in either side of Private Law.92
Jorge Esquirol holds rather ironically that "Latin American societies are not
European, only their jurists pretend to be." Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin
American Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 425, 470 (1997).
88. "The distinction between Civil and Commercial law is deeply rooted in
continental countries .... ."ADRiAAN DORRESTEIJN ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 8
(Kiuwer Law and Taxation 1994). Such dichotomy usually creates interpretation
problems. "As a result, therefore, while contracts of a commercial nature (i.e.
contracts between merchants or between a merchant and a consumer) are governed
by the applicable provisions of the Commercial Code, the basic principles of
contractual obligation are determined according to the rules stated in the civil code
applicable to the transaction." ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 551.
89. After the enactment of the 1942 Civil Code of Italy, there is a tendency
towards the unification of Private Law. "There is a branch of Private Law which, by
simple inertia, is still labeled with an ancient name. Such name was meaningful in
the past but lacks a specific purpose today. This branch is referred to as Commercial
Law." FRANCESCO GALGANO, DERECHO COMERCIAL 1 (Jorge Guerrero trans., Temis
1999).
90. According to Stephen Zamora, "[uinlike the Uniform Commercial Code
adopted in the United States, which in general applies to merchants and nonmerchants, the Commercial Code (of Mexico) only applies to 'acts of commerce' which
are defined as certain types of acts carried out between merchants or between a
merchant and a non-merchant." ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 541.
91. See, e.g., BoRis KOZOLCHYK, EL DERECHO COMERCIAL ANTE EL LIBRE COMERCIO Y
EL DESARROLLO ECON6MICO 193 (McGraw-Hill 1996) ("[Elven in those cases in which
the authors of civil and commercial codes adopted what they believed were clear
boundaries between these codes, the reality of business transactions showed them
their failure.").
92. More than fifty years ago, Phanor Eder observed appropriately that "in
countries where there are no special courts for merchants I can find no justification
today for the basic distinction made in Latin America between civil and commercial
law." EDER, supra note 27, at 32.
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Although an effort to reunite the above-mentioned disciplines
has resulted in the preparation of several draft legislations in
various Latin American countries,93 local legislators have not been
inclined to adopt unified statutes for Private Law in which obligations and contracts could be homogenously regulated. 4 As a result
of this dichotomy, company law is usually divided into two different sets of legislation included in separate codes or statutes.
Similar to their European counterparts, Latin American
codes and statutes on corporations tend to be characterized by a
framework of mandatory rules on accounting principles, capital
maintenance, disclosure standards, domestic mergers and securities regulation.95 Company law in Latin America can be accurately
described as a shareholder friendly regulation in which controlling
equity owners are granted full powers to determine corporate policy both in closely held companies and public corporations.96
Nevertheless, an overwhelming concern with the regulatory
problems associated with the protection of investors, creditors and
minority shareholders has been a constant preoccupation in Latin
America. As early as 1952, Phanor Eder pointed to the preoccupation of Latin American Corporate Law legislators regarding "the
integrity of the capital, in order to protect creditors and investors,
and to adopt measures which will protect minority sharehold93. See generally ARTURO VALENCIA ZEA, PROYECTO DE C6DIGO DE DERECHO
PRVADO (Superintendencia de Notariado y Registro 1980).
94. Incredibly enough, several Latin American authors still promote the
dichotomy of private law under theoretical and historical arguments. According to
Roberto Mantilla Molina, "merging civil and commercial law is not viable.
Nevertheless, it would be convenient to eliminate several differences that exist
between them." ROBERT MANTILLA MOLINA, DERECHO MERCANTIL 36 (Editorial Porr-ia,
29th ed. 1996). In a similar fashion, the Mexican author Joaquin Rodriguez
emphasizes the independence of commercial law vis-A-vis civil law. "The underlying

unity of civil and commercial law is undeniable; but its separation is not capricious or
arbitrary for it obeys to profound reasons, basically related to the need to attend to
the demands of commerce, for which civil law had proven to be insufficient and
useless due to its formalistic and ritual nature ....
JOAQUfN RODRfGUEZ, CURSo DE
DERECHO MERCANTIL 17 (Editorial Porr-ia, 26th ed. 2003). A very relevant exception

to this anachronism can be found in the enactment of the Brazilian Civil Code
(effective as of 12 January 2002). Such important codification unifies civil and
commercial law regulations on obligations and contracts. See Werter R. Faria, 0 Aval,
0 C6digo Civil E Os Bancos, in 134 REVISTA DE DIREITO MERCANTIL: INDUSTRIAL,
ECONOMICO E FINANCEIRO 49 (2004).
95. See JOSEPH MCCAHERY ET AL., THE GOVERNANCE OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND
PARTNERSHIPS US AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 195 (Oxford University Press 2004).

96. See generally Jose W. Fernndez et al., Corporate Caveat Emptor: Minority
Shareholder Rights in Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina, 32 U. MIAMI
INTER-Am. L. REV. 157 (2001) (explaining that majority shareholders in Latin America
often have a statutory right to dominate minority shareholders).
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ers."9 7 Indeed, several different provisions incorporated in most
Commercial Codes and corporate statutes of Latin America consecrate countless protections for minority shareholders. Criticism
based upon the lack of enforceability of many of these restrictive
regulations can be found in texts written by the same authoras
early as the nineteen fifties."'
In a recent survey of the laws of corporations of several Latin
American countries, another authors' conclusion is similar to
Eder's in the sense that in the region shareholders' generally are
subject to a less significant degree of legal protection as compared
to the US. 9 Another frequent criticism relates to the inadequate
drafting of many of these provisions and the ease with which
investors can find loopholes and other manners to circumvent
imperative provisions and expropriate minority shareholders."0
V.

STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE THE AGENCY PROBLEMS

ARISING FROM CONFLICTS BETWEEN MAJORITY AND
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

In light of the prominent ownership concentration that
prevails within the region, the basic governance structure should
address the main strategies to protect minority shareholders. A
reduction in controlling shareholder powers for the benefit of
97. Eder, supra note 83.
98. "All the laws [of Latin America], like our own, contain prohibitions against the
declaration of dividends, or other devices of distribution, except out of surplus net
profits; but our prohibitions are more effective in practice." Eder, supra note 83.
99. See FernAndez et al., supra note 96, at 171.
100. Fernando Londofio commented on the corporate provisions contained in the
Colombian Commercial Code of 1971: "Code provisions banning directors to vote in
shareholders' assemblies', others requiring minimum distributions of dividends and
mandatory information preceding shareholders' meetings or the requirement of a
plural number of persons in order for a quorum to be present, turned out to be a
joking matter for experts in playing games with the law." Fernando Londofio, El
C6digo de Comercio 15 aftos despuds: i En qug ha cambiado la vida colombiana?in I
REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 159 (1987). La Porta thinks that this phenomenon is
germane only to countries that pertain to the civil law tradition. "The expansion of
legal precedents to additional violations of fiduciary duty, and the fear of such
expansion, limit the expropriation by the insiders in common law countries. In
contrast, laws in civil law systems are made by legislatures, and judges are not
supposed to go beyond the statutes and apply 'smell tests' and fairness opinions. As a
consequence, a corporate insider who finds a way not explicitly forbidden by the
statutes to expropriate outside investors can proceed without fear of an adverse
judicial ruling.... The vague fiduciary duty principles of the common law are more
protective of investors than the bright line rules of the civil law, which can often be
circumvented by sufficiently imaginative insiders." La Porta et al., supra note 63, at
9-10.
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minorities and other constituencies is usually considered to be a
useful device. Several strategies have been sought to achieve the
goals of protection of weak investors from the risk of oppression by
majorities. Following Kraakman and Hansmann's classification, it
is useful to consider the following four strategies: (1) The appointment rights strategy; (2) The decision rights strategy; (3) The
trusteeship strategy, and (4) The reward, constrains, and affiliation rights strategies."' All of these tactics have been dealt with to
a high extent by Latin American corporate law statutes long
before the emergence of corporate governance as a separate discipline. In fact, most of the legal devices required for the implementation of such four strategies are contained usually in regulatory
provisions set forth in commercial codes and corporate law decrees
and laws across the area. In order to verify this premise it suffices
to classify and review the relevant provisions in accordance with
the chart set forth in Annex A.
A.

The Appointment Rights Strategy

The basic manner in which this tactic is legally pursued consists on the consecration of proportional voting for the election of
directors. Systems such as cumulative voting, or the reservation of
seats for minority shareholders are some of the proceedings used
for this purpose. Almost all Latin American jurisdictions include
these sorts of legal devices. While most US jurisdictions have
abandoned the concept of proportional representation in favor of a
default rule of straight voting, 12 commercial codes and corporate
statutes still abide by the more conservative representational
rule.
An unusual and stringent possibility to curb the rights of
majorities in the context of board elections relates to the existence
of legally imposed vote caps. As a result of this sort of restrictions
majority shareholders are not allowed to exercise more than a certain percentage of the votes attached to their shares, irrespective
101. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 54-61.
102. Stephen Bainbridge explains the underlying rational for such departure from
cumulative voting in the US: "During the last few decades, however, cumulative
voting in public corporations has increasingly fallen out of favor. Opponents of
cumulative voting argue it produces an adversarial board and results in critical
decisions being made in private meetings held by the majority faction before the
formal board meeting." STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW & ECONOMICS
445-46 (Foundation Press 2002). Only 8 states in the US have mandatory cumulative
voting. Id.
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of the size of their holdings. 10 3 This system is still viable in Brazil

and Chile and was legally feasible until recently in Colombia.'1
Another possibility to assure minority representation stems out
from the so-called weak vote caps, °5 namely, legal restrictions
that prevent shareholders to exercise voting rights in excess of
their economic stake in the corporation. Weak voting caps are
related to the principle one share, one vote, which reflects a prorata allocation of decision-making rights. They are usually present in most Latin American corporate codes and statutes.0
B.

The Decision Rights Strategy

The second strategy to protect minority shareholders rights is
related to the manner in which fundamental corporate transactions are adopted. The underlying concern here relates to the idea
of allowing minority shareholders to block certain important decisions by the exercise of veto rights that arise from supermajority
provisions. This is an extremely useful device in Latin America,
for it allows holders of minority interests to actively participate in
crafting policies regarding fundamental corporate transactions.
As Hansmann and Kraakman properly suggest, "in most circumstances, supermajority voting, like voting caps or proportional voting, is likely to matter chiefly in closely held companies and public
companies with concentrated ownership." 107 Most jurisdictions in
the area not only allow for supermajorities as a rule of choice, but
also set forth regulatory provisions devising supermajority
approval for various relevant shareholders' decisions.
103. These restrictions are referred to as strong vote caps. "Strong vote capping
reduces the voting rights of large shareholders below their proportionate economic
ownership, and thus implicitly inflates the voting power of smaller shareholders: for
example, a stipulation that no shareholder, regardless of the size of her holdings, may
exercise more than 5% of the votes at the annual shareholders' meeting." KRAAviAN
ET AL., supra note 32, at 55. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of this sort of restriction is
at least debatable. As early as 1952, Phanor Eder had pointed out to the possible
uselessness of such protective devices. "In the attempt to protect the minority
shareholders against the majority, artificial restrictions, annoying and generally
ineffective, have been imposed on voting rights." Eder, supra note 22.
104. Article 242 of Law 222 of 1995, repealed the restriction provided under Article
428 of the Colombian Commercial Code whereby shareholders were not entitled to
vote in excess of 25% irrespective of their shareholding percentage.
105. See KRAAKmAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 56.
106. A notorious exception is associated with multiple voting rights that exist in
Argentina and Venezuela.
107. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 57.
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C. The Trusteeship Strategy
This tactic refers to the usefulness of a board of directors that
is not subject to pressures or dependency constrains arising from
the relationship of its members with controlling shareholders.
Therefore, the purpose of a trusteeship strategy is to allow for a
considerable degree of independence of directors not only from the
corporation's managers but also from the holders of a majority
interest. For this purpose Hansmann and Kraakman suggest
three basic methods: (1) To weaken the rights of shareholders as a
whole to appoint directors; (2) to disrupt financial ties of board
members to controlling shareholders, and (3) to require board
approval for relevant corporate decisions.'
This used to be one of the weakest fields of corporate governance substantive law in Latin America. However, most major
countries have now adopted regulations aimed at providing independence of board members and insulating them from undue
influences coming from majority shareholders. 9
D.

The Reward, Constraints, and Affiliation Rights
Strategies

A final strategy aimed at protecting minority shareholders
encompasses legal devices not only aimed at providing all shareholders with an equal treatment, but also at the enactment of provisions consecrating fiduciary duties, remedies for oppression,
controls for the abuse of rights and other standards to scrutinize
directors and majority shareholders' conduct. Within this same
group of strategies, the authors also include provisions regarding
conflicted transactions, mandatory disclosure rules and dissenter
rights such as the appraisal remedy. 0
Most of these legal protections can be found in the substantive corporate laws of Latin America. In fact, the already men108. Id. at 58-59.
109. Many countries in Latin America have regulations dealing with corporate
governance that were issued or enacted by local legislatures, governments, securities
agencies and stock exchanges throughout Latin America. See, e.g., Venezuela:
Resolution # 19-1-2005, issued by the Comisi6n Nacional de Valores; for Colombia:
Resolution 275 of 2003, issued by the Superintendencia de Valores and Law 964 of
2005; for Brazil, Law 10.303 of 2001; for Argentina, Decree 677 of 2001.
110. Obviously, dissenter rights are more effective as an exit strategy than simple
transference rights. "Standing alone, a transfer right provides less protection than a
withdrawal right, since an informed transferee steps into the shoes of the transferor,
and will therefore offer a price that impounds the expected future loss of value from
insider mismanagement or opportunism." KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 24-25.
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tioned concern as to the situation of minority shareholders has
determined an ongoing process of amendment in regards to the
statutes and codes governing business corporations. As a result of
these legal reforms, the catalogue of minority shareholders rights
in many of these countries may even exceed the number of prerogatives granted to minority investors within statutes enacted in
other more developed areas of the world.111
VI.

OECD WHITE PAPER ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
LATIN AMERICA

The influence of the OECD as well as of other international
institutions112 has resulted in the adoption by various Latin American countries of recommendations rendered by the different
working groups of such organizations. 13
In the specific field of corporate governance, the OECD has
advanced a number of recommendations for reform in Latin
America."' For this purpose, the organization has taken into
account the region's main legal and social features. The White
Paper on Corporate Governance contains a list of priorities for
111. P.B. Hannon characterizes the regulation of the stock corporation in Latin
America as irritating, even though it is justified by its apologists "as necessary for the
protection of unsophisticated shareholders and creditors." Hannon, supra note 29, at
756.
112. See generally The Latin American Corporate Governance and Companies
Roundtable of the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en-2649_37439_
2048255 1 1_1_37439,00.html (containing links to material on reform proposals
related to Latin America). The predominance of international credit agencies has also
been a significant factor for the adoption of corporate governance recommendations.
In accordance with their policies, "moving into an international equity market
requires many Latin American companies to elevate their corporate governance to a
new level." IFC and Corporate Governance, Latin America, http://www.ifc.org.
According to Roe "international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank have admirably promoted corporate law reform, especially that
which would protect minority stockholders. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and the World Bank have had major initiatives to
improve corporate governance, both in the developing and the developed worlds."
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 237 (2002).
113. See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 36. Other international institutions are
constantly promoting legal reform in Latin America. "The World Bank's active
support for law reform projects in Latin America is premised on the idea that secure
and predictable legal environments are necessary for investment and market oriented
development." Thome, supra note 4, at 706.
114. Pursuant to Lefort and Walker, "a standard framework to analyze corporate
governance practices is provided by the OECD principles. These principles
acknowledge not only the importance of legal protection, but also of other mechanisms
of corporate governance". Fernando Lefort & Eduardo Walker, The Effect of
Corporate Governance Practiceson Company Market Valuation and Payout Policy in
Chile, 2 (March 2005), http:l/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=676710.
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reform and detailed suggestions in regards to minute legal
problems that arise in the context of the corporate organization." 5
The White Paper on Corporate Governance for Latin America
focuses on legal reform priorities and specific recommendations on
that subject. The former are aimed at identifying the fundamental
weaknesses of the legal infrastructure that require urgent attention of policymakers across the region. The latter are specific topics that should be addressed in order to improve the corporate
governance framework in the concerned countries. "'
The OECD lists the following six reform priorities: (i) Taking
voting rights seriously; (ii) treating shareholders fairly during
changes in corporate control and de-listing; (iii) ensuring the
integrity of financial reporting and improving the disclosure of
related party transactions; (iv) developing effective boards of
directors; (v) improving the quality, effectiveness and predictability of the legal and regulatory framework and (vi) continuing
regional co-operation.
The first preoccupation relates to the exercise of voting rights
during shareholders' assemblies. The OECD considers that measures should be taken to allow for a more active participation of
115. Heloisa Bedicks considers that these recommendations relate to the following
issues:
" Respect for the rights of shareholders (specifically minority
shareholders) and taking voting rights seriously
" Emergence of active and informed owners (transparency
practices)
" Equitable treatment of shareholders particularly in changes of
control and in de-listings
• Emphasis on the role of stakeholders in corporate governance
" Quality and integrity of financial reporting
* Disclosure of ownership and control (transparency)
• Conflicts of interest and related-party transactions
" Reporting on internal corporate governance structures and
practices
" Board integrity and director independence (i.e., acting in the
best interest of the company)
* Improved compliance and effective enforcement
" Encouragement in reporting illegal or unethical behavior
Bedicks et al., supra note 6, at 223.
116. Such changes do not necessarily imply amendments to the corporate
legislation. Interestingly enough, "recent Western scholarship has suggested that the
key issues of corporate governance are largely outside corporate law, as
conventionally defined. Corporate codes are largely devoted to regulating the
interaction of shareholders, managers, and creditors. But the most important
practical distinctions now seem to depend on how shares are allocated among
different types of investors, which in turn depends on a variety of rules outside the
corporate code". William H. Simon, The Legal Structure of the Chinese "Socialist
Market" Enterprise, 21 J. CORP. L. 267, 289 (1996).
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minority shareholders' and institutional investors in such meetings.' 17 These steps include the reduction of procedural formalities
for the disclosure of information, the incorporation of effective
director nomination mechanisms that enable minority shareholders to actually elect board members and the use of new technologies to "provide shareholders and markets with as timely access to
required disclosures as possible."11 8
The second OECD reform priority relates to the equitable
treatment of shareholders in several different hypotheses. For
instance, pursuant to the White Paper, Latin American legislators
should set forth specific rules regarding minority rights during
changes in corporate control." 9 The Organization also focuses on
the need to provide for fairness guidelines in order to protect
minority shareholders in the event of de-listing of public corporations. Undeniably, minority shareholders must have exit rights to
compensate the loss of liquidity that may ensue in the event of a
shareholder decision to de-list. Failure to provide such appropriate mechanisms usually results in distrust and reluctance to
invest in publicly held corporations. In fact, the risk of being held
hostage in a closely held firm deters investors from participating
in the securities market. Nevertheless, there is a delicate balance
between dissenters' rights in de-listings and appropriate incentives for a corporation to go public. In fact, the requirements for
de-listing should not be so burdensome as to discourage companies
from listing their securities in the stock exchanges of the area.2
A third proposal to amend the regional legislation is concerned with the need to insure transparency and appropriate disclosure not only in regards to the financial reporting by the
corporation, but also concerning interested party transactions.
Lack of disclosure of accurate information is a significant deter117. WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 13.

118. Id. at 15-16.
119. "Improved predictability with respect to shareholder treatment during
changes in corporate control will allow investors to make better informed investment
decisions, increases the ability of markets to properly price traded shares, and should
result in less overall volatility stemming from uncertainty and disappointment." Id.
at 18.
120. For instance, article. 1.2.5.7 of Resolution 400 of 1995 requires for the delisting of a Colombian corporation that shareholders holding at least 99% of the
shares of stock approve the decision. If such supermajority is not reached, the
controlling stockholders to all dissenting persons must launch a tender offer. The
latter are entitled to be bought out pursuant to a complicated appraisal remedy
provided for under the statute. Even if the supermajority is reached, the remaining
stockholders (no more than 1%) are allowed to exercise an exit right. See id.
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rent for the growth of capital markets in the area. Establishing
homogenous disclosure rules necessarily enables the comparison
of financial data and allows for informed decision-making. To be
sure, unreliability of financial information gives rise to confusion
as to the actual prices of securities. Using international accounting principles may also attract foreign investors who speak a uniform financial language. Irrespective of this necessary reform,
such accounting and financial amendments must be accompanied
by a serious policy of enforceability preferably monitored by
administrative agencies. On the other hand, the regulation of
interested party transactions has already been a matter of concern in some countries in the area. However, several corporate
statutes lack a comprehensive treatment of these topics. The
OECD suggests that the assessment of this issue is aimed at eliminating such conflicts of interest. It is true that prejudicial selfdealing transactions are facilitated by the absence of prohibitions
of this nature. It is also acknowledged that this problem can be
dealt with in a more appropriate manner by full disclosure of conflicting transactions accompanied by an authorization rendered by
shareholders or disinterested directors rather than by altogether
barring these transactions.
A fourth priority is associated with the independence of
boards of directors. 2' In fact, the OECD recommends that board
members should act independently in the interest of the company
and its shareholders within the duties of care and loyalty.'22 The
need to foster objective decision-making processes, which are in
accordance with the interests of the company -and not only with
the interests of a certain group of stockholders-, may very well justify this recommendation. It is therefore appropriate to promote
board structures and practices that reinforce the ability of directors to act independently of management and controlling share121. According to Lefort, "as a consequence of the high ownership concentration
observed in most firms in the region, boards in Latin American countries tend to be
much weaker than in the US or UK, and constitute a poor governance mechanism."
Lefort & Walker, supra note 114, at 18.
122. A relevant consequence of a truly independent board of directors is the
possibility of an appropriate cross-scrutiny of fellow members and other parties. "A
separately-constituted board can also provide a check on opportunistic behavior by
controlling shareholders -either toward their fellow shareholders or toward other
parties who deal with the firm, such as creditors or employees- by providing a
convenient target of personal liability for decisions made by the firm." KRAAKMA ET
AL., supra note 32, at 12. Obviously, in order for a board to be independent, such
quality must be applicable to the majority of its members. A majority of outside
directors is an important means of mitigating the agency problem between controlling
and minority shareholders. Id. at 30.
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holders. Various Latin American jurisdictions have enacted
regulatory statutes to determine the need to include independent
directors, especially, in publicly held corporations. 23 In spite of the
obvious importance of this recommendation, it must not be
ignored that the absence of a separation between ownership and
control allows direct monitoring on managers and directors by
block holders, which in turn subjects the former to a high degree
of control. Accordingly, due care must be exercised to avoid the
impairment of advantages arising from strict control by blockholders. A balance must be struck through legal reform between a
significant autonomy in the board's decision-making processes
and the benefits for minority stockholders that stem out of the socalled "free ride" regarding the monitoring activities of block
holders.
Even if it is listed as the fifth priority, the improvement of the
regulatory framework should be considered to be the most significant problem in the area. The OECD points out to the need to
strengthen the capacity of rule-making and enforcement bodies
and to ensure that the legal framework supports effective use of
private actions. Probably one of the aspects in which the OECD
demonstrates an appropriate analysis in regards to the situation
of Corporate Law in Latin America, is that concerning causes of
action granted to shareholders. 24 The White Paper considers that
a reform priority should be the incorporation of private actions to
allow shareholders to resort to class action suits and mechanisms
for alternative dispute resolution. 125 The implementation of these
mechanisms in different areas of Company Law and Corporate
Governance will improve the quality of the regulatory frame123. For example, Colombian Law 964 of 2005 and Argentine decree 677 of 2001.
Moreover, while Mexican law "is not known for emphasizing conflicts of interest
principles, Mexican corporations law takes conflicts seriously. Thus, board members
who have a conflict of interests (conflicto de intereses)in any transaction of business of
the corporation must apprise the other board members of the situation, and must
refrain from participating in all deliberations concerning the matter in question
(LGSM, Article 156). Where such conflict exists, a director is usually required to leave
the board of directors meeting while a decision is made by the remaining directors."
ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 588.
124. In this sense, some authors have held the need for corporate governance codes:
"Markets that have national corporate governance codes in place have a marginal
advantage over those that do not in the competition for international equity capital.
Codes contribute to reduce risk in a market by clarifying a benchmark of minimum
standards of accountability, governance and control." Revista Buen Gobierno, CAmara
de Comercio de Bogota, 2003, at 112.
125. Until recently class action suits were only allowed in certain common law
countries.
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work.126 It is of the essence to contemplate and remove obstacles
that hinder the effective use of potentially efficient mechanisms
for the settlement of shareholders' disputes. As it will be
explained in further detail below, some of the countries in the area
have taken serious steps to improve the enforceability of Corporate Law by allocating quasi-judicial powers to administrative
agencies. Such governmental institutions as the General Inspection of Justice of Argentina and the Colombian Superintendence of
Corporations also provide predictability to the market participants by creating a significant body of administrative
precedents.12'

The last priority concerns continuing legal co-operation. Probably the relevance of this recommendation relates more to the
need for some degree of harmonization among the difference corporate law systems of the area, rather than to monitor the implementation of conclusions. The existence of a number of regional
treaties such as Mercosur and the Andean Pact has not contributed to the actual approximation of the countries' legislation in
the field of business associations. 12 As a consequence of such lack
of harmonization, a significant disparity is still the rule. A
regional approach similar to the European real seat doctrine
determines that the law applicable to business corporations 1 is29
that of the country in which they have their actual operation.
126. According to Erik Berglof "in most societies, it is largely private initiatives
that help enforce existing laws and regulations. The government creates the rules
governing private conduct but leaves the initiation of enforcement to private parties.
When a party feels cheated, he or she could initiate a private suit and take it to the
court or other agency". Erik Berglof, Enforcement and CorporateGovernance 22, (The
World Bank, Working Paper No. 3409, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=625286.
127. "For the field of corporate law, the existence of the Superintendencia in
particular probably also assures that there will be interstitial development of some
kind: the value placed on consistency in the western legal tradition almost inevitably
must give Superintendencia decisions at least a de facto precedential authority".
ROBERT

DEVELOPMENT

OF LAW:

CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATION LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLOMBIA

CHARLES

MEANS,

UNDERDEVELOPMENT

AND

THE

287 (The

University of North Carolina Press 1980).
128. "The most remarkable feature of South American integration is that it is a
disorderly and multiple process that permits parallel and overlapping initiatives."
Radl Anibal Etcheverry, The Mercosur: Business Enterprise Organizationand Joint
Ventures, 39 ST. Louis U. L. J. 979, 983 (1995). Latin America has seen "the
emergence of a number of economic unions patterned, to some extent, on the
European Community. The largest of the South American Regional trade
associations, MERCOSUR, for example, unites Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and
Paraguay. It is still too early to gauge the success of these new economic
combinations." BACKER, supra note 31, at xxxv.

129. The Treaty of Montevideo of 1889 sets forth a rule whereby all business
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This circumstance hinders the development of a market for corporate chartering similar to the one existing in the U.S. Such situation is a factor for the underdevelopment of the corporate system
due to the lack of competition between jurisdictions. 3 ' This last
circumstance is aggravated by a complete lack of concern for the
harmonization of corporate regimes. As a consequence, there is
neither the market-driven pressure for the enactment of modern
avant-gardecorporate regulations nor the legal obligation to adopt
uniform standards imposed by supranational organisms such as
the ones provided for under the Andean Pact.' Mandatory harmonization would be a sensible step to be undertaken in the process of integration, even more so in light of the execution of Free
Trade Agreements with the U.S. by some countries.
Besides the above-mentioned reform priorities, the OECD has
also developed recommendations related, inter alia, to shareholders' rights. In this sense, a suggestion that could be suitable for
the matter of equity participation within a company is the one
related to the one share/one vote rule. This rule should be
enforced, "unless it can be demonstrated that sufficient checks
and balances, effective legal protections and enforcement mechanisms are in place to ensure that the contractual and statutory
rights of limited voting and non-voting shares will be adequately
protected."1 32 In this regard, Mierta Capaul holds that Brazil is
well known for the widespread use of non-voting shares in order to
separate control from cash flow rights. 133 In addition, in Mexico,
associations will be governed under the laws existing in the country of their domicile.
"In constructing TM89, it was decided that the law of the country where the basic
elements of a company were originated and perfected was the most appropriate to
regulate the existence and capacity of a corporation. Article 4 provides that the
relationships between the shareholders and the company and third persons, as well
as the form of the contract which gives birth to the company, are subject to the law of
the corporation's domicile." Beatriz Pallar~s, InternationalRegime of Commercial
Companies in Argentina and Mercosur, 32 STETSON L. REV. 785, 801 (2003).
Nevertheless, the comparative lack of corporate mobility within the region, represents
an obstacle for the creation of markets for corporate chartering. This lack of mobility
is caused by the usual legal requirement to set up a local corporate structure in order
to carry out business in each Latin American jurisdiction.
130. See RoMANo, supra note 58, at (explaining the race for the bottom versus the
race to the top debate).
131. A different dynamic arises from the activity of the European Council that has
fostered several directives aimed at the harmonization of corporate law in the
European Union. See DORESTEIJN ET AL., supra note 88, at 27-28.
132. WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 15.

133. In this sense, Capaul holds that non-voting shares represented "the majority
of traded shares and 46 percent of the total equity of listed companies." The author
further notes that "[u]ntil 2001, it was possible to structure the capital of a
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dual-vote shareholding structures were designed to promote foreign investment without local entrepreneurs losing control of their
companies." As in other Latin American countries, Chile
presents a very high ownership concentration and a corporate
structure dominated by the presence of conglomerates, which in
turn tend to separate their voting rights from cash flow rights
through the use of the so-called pyramidal structures. 135 Thus, it is
clear that non-voting shares are a useful mechanism of obtaining
resources at a lower cost for the corporation and its controllers.
Indeed, if minority shareholders are not entitled to voting rights,
their participation at shareholders' meetings may become a mere
formality.
Even though the above-mentioned rule of one share/one vote
is an important principle, it is already set forth under most Latin
American corporate codes and statutes. Nonetheless, it should be
taken into account that voting shares are an important mechanism that allows corporations to obtain financing. 3 ' At the same
time, non-voting shareholders benefit from a preferred dividend
corporation with two-thirds of nonvoting shares, the rest being in the form of ordinary
voting shares. Thus a corporation could be controlled by shareholders owning only
16.7 percent of its total share capital." Mierta Capaul, CorporateGovernance in Latin
America 5, http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/LAC/lacinfoclient.nsf/ldaa46103229
123885256831005ce0eb/7865c8ecf52ed8d585256ea9005blb6a/$FILE/Corporate%20
Governance%20in%20LAC.pdf. However, according to the different sources already
quoted, the prevailing structure of control in Latin America shows a significant equity
concentration and a tendency on the part of controlling stockholders to retain a large
percentage of shares of stock.
134. "As a general rule, all shares must have equal value and confer equal rights on
all shareholders, in keeping with the general requirement that shareholder
agreements may not produce legal effects that exclude any shareholder from sharing
in the profits ([General Corporation Law of Mexico or] L.G.S.M., article 17). There are
important exceptions to this general rule, however, and L.G.S.M. Article 112 allows
shareholders to agree that the capital stock may be divided into several different
classes of shares, and that special rights may be granted to the respective holders of
each type. Thus, the articles of incorporation may limit the rights of the holders of
certain classes of shares to only one right: the right to vote at extraordinary
shareholders' meetings where fundamental matters are decided." ZAMORA ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 582.
135. According to Lefort, Chilean conglomerates have a relatively simple structure.
"The most common way of separating voting from cash flow rights is through simple
pyramid structures with only 1/3 of affiliated listed companies being second or higher
tier in the pyramidal structure." WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 49.
136. There seems to be a contradiction between the idea of providing access to
inexpensive financing for local corporations and the strict enforceability of the one
share/one vote principle. Non-voting shares are a well-known useful mechanism of
obtaining capital resources at a lower cost. Furthermore, since minority shareholders
are not entitled to veto rights, their participation at shareholders' meetings may
become a mere formality.
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as well as a liquidation priority. Granting these groups of shareholders non-voting rights would not necessarily result in an active
participation in the corresponding decision-making bodies. Moreover, empirical data shows that at least in large corporations the
principle of one share/one vote does not have a significant impact
on the structures of ownership and control. "The results suggest
that multiple classes of shares are not a central mechanism of separating ownership and control." 3 7
According to the OECD's recommendation, non-voting shareholders' views should be taken into account in the company's decision-making process and "should be accorded the same rights and
treatment regarding notice of and opportunity to be heard in the
General Meetings."'3 s Bearing in mind that non-voting stockholders are not granted with decision-making power, implementing
this recommendation would be burdensome for the corporation.
The emphasis should instead be placed in reinforcing their access
to information, as well as to strengthen their possibility to challenge oppressive and unjust decisions on behalf of voting
shareholders."3 9
If the recommendation is taken to an extreme, local regulation would not allow the issuance of non-voting securities by any
corporation. This idea appears to be fully inconsistent with the
need to develop local securities exchanges. Indeed, suppression of
non-voting stock would be detrimental to local markets and may
not provide a significant improvement in minority shareholders'
treatment.
The organization also insists that shareholders be provided
with adequate notice, specific voting procedures for general meetings, as well as the need to include an agenda containing information about the matters to be treated in these meetings. 6° In spite
137. La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 54 J. OF FIN.
ECON. 2, 499-500 (1999).
138. WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 16.

139. Some authors have pointed out that all shareholders should be treated in an
equitable way, including the minority and foreign stockholders, which should be given
causes of action to challenge the violation of their rights. Cf IRUJO & VITOLO, supra
note 49 at 24.
140. See, e.g., IRUJO & VITOLO, supra note 49 at 25. The relevance of holding
shareholders meetings is fully recognized in most Latin American jurisdictions. As
early as 1960, Hannon pointed out to the overwhelming nature of the requirements
associated with these sessions. "For the S.A. directed by the domestic parent in the
Unites States, the requirements in various Commercial Codes (of Latin America) for
meetings of the ostensible or actual owners may be a time-consuming and costly
nuisance." P.B. Hannon, supra note 29, at 759.
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of the relevance of such recommendation, most Latin American
corporate statutes have already adopted notice of meeting requirements. 4 1 For example, Mexican and Colombian statutes generally
demand a notice issued fifteen days in advance of a general meeting of shareholder. 4 1 Such provisions are usually specific and in
some cases so restrictive that they prevent shareholders from
modifying the agenda in the absence of majority vote. Some of
these countries also require due notice in the press in order to fulfill the aforementioned duty to inform. These requirements may
even be stricter than the U.S. standard for publicly-held
companies.
The OECD also holds that non-controlling shareholders
should be allowed "to collectively achieve a voice by influencing
the composition of the board of directors."4 According to the
organization, non-controlling shareholders should have a realistic
opportunity not only to appoint board members but also to access
information relevant to the company.
The OECD strongly recommends the so-called "shareholder
activism." It holds that an appropriate legal environment could
have the effect of encouraging institutional investors to make
informed decisions that allow them to maximize returns.4 For
such purpose, the White Paper emphasizes on adopting corporate
141. Most Latin American countries have also adopted mechanisms whereby
minority shareholders are entitled to summon a meeting of the general assembly.
According to Capaul, minority shareholders in Mexico holding ten percent of a public
company's voting or limited voting shares may call a shareholders' meeting, while in
Bolivia and Colombia the percentage remains at twenty percent. In Brazil and Peru
the required number of shares for this same matter is of five percent. Capaul, supra
note 133, at 10.
142. Article 186 of the General Corporation Law of Mexico; Article 424 of the
Colombian Commercial Code; see also Article 278 of the Ecuadorian Company Act and
124-1 of the Brazilian Corporation Law No. 6.404 (requiring 8 days for notice of
meeting).
143. WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 16.
144. In Latin America, pension funds could be considered as a powerful group of
domestic investors with a high degree of influence on corporate governance. According
to Iglesias-Palau, "since the early eighties and as the result of radical reforms to their
social security systems, pension funds have come to play a leading role in capital
markets of many Latin American countries. So far, Chile shows the most interesting
experience, with a twenty-year-old system, a very active presence in capital markets
and mature regulations." Augusto Iglesias-Palau, Pension reform and Corporate
Governance: Impact in Chile, REVISTA ABANTE, Vol. 3, No. 1, Oct/Abr 2000, at 110.
Moreover, early pension fund reforms in Chile, Argentina, Peru and Mexico gave
institutional investors an important role as capital suppliers. Lefort holds in this
regard that "pension reform has triggered capital market and corporate law reforms
that have helped to improve overall minority shareholders protection." See WHITE
PAPER, supra note 36, at 50.
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statutes that encourage pension funds and other institutional
investors to exercise their ownership rights in an informed way.
Specifically, the OECD suggests the implementation of provisions
that enhance the flow of information between the company and
such investors. This is one of the aspects in which the influence of
the U.S. law and practice has arrived too late in Latin America.
Indeed, this recommendation conflicts with empirical demonstration of this policy's limited effectiveness. "Today, there is relatively little evidence that shareholder activism has mattered.
Even the most active institutional investors spend only trifling
amounts on corporate governance activism. Institutions devote little effort to monitoring management; to the contrary, they typically disclaim the ability or desire to decide company-specific
policy questions (... ). Most importantly, empirical studies of U.S.
institutional investor activism have found 'no strong evidence of a
correlation between firm performance and percentage of shares
owned by institutions."1
The OECD proposes a scheme whereby ADR holders should
be granted similar rights to those provided to holders of the underlying shares.'46 In that manner, the White Paper asserts that ADR
holders should also have pre-emptive rights in new share offerings.'47 It also recommends that national legislation in the country
of the issuing corporation should ensure "that the proxy voting
system functions equally well for ADR holders as it does for those
who hold the underlying shares."'48 This recommendation appears
to be rather unusual. The legislative process to amend the corporation laws is cumbersome and time-consuming in most of the
countries in the region. Changing the voting rights to allow outsiders -like ADR holders- to participate in shareholders' meetings
may imply a radical departure from the ownership and capital
structure of local corporate law. It may also entail a difficulty to
differentiate the voting rights of the ADR depositary and those
145. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 102, at 515.
146. WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 16. An American Depository Receipt (ADR) is
a certificate issued by U.S. depository that represents a number of shares of stock
issued by a non-U.S. company. In a number of cases Latin American corporations
have taken advantage of ADR programs in order to access the broader U.S. capital
market.
147. "Pre-emptive rights give an existing shareholder the opportunity to purchase
or subscribe for a proportionate part of a new issue of shares before it is offered to
other persons. Its purpose is to protect shareholders from dilution of value and control
when new shares are issued. In modern statutes, preemptive rights may be limited or
denied." HAMILTON, supra note 46, at 466-67.
148. WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 16.
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that pertain to their individual holders. Moreover, it seems dubious that the investors acquiring ADRs could have an intention to
participate in the decision-making processes of the issuer of the
underlying shares. In fact, if the investor were willing to have a
saying in corporate affairs, it would appear to be more reasonable
for her to directly acquire shares of stock in the corporation. In
conclusion, a recommendation that does not seem to be realistic,
particularly in light of the small number of ADR programs in
place as compared to local issuance of shares.
Regarding the recommendations addressing the equitable
treatment of shareholders the OECD insists that the legal framework should strengthen minority shareholders' rights in the event
of change in corporate control.149 These reforms should not only be
aimed at allowing investors to make better-informed investment
decisions but also to increase the ability of markets to properly
price traded shares. Consequently, measures like these will contribute to a climate of confidence which in turn could be appropriate to foster market development. A clear-cut definition of the
precise meaning of a change in corporate control as well as other
events that may be detrimental to minority shareholders is also
advisable. The White Paper recognizes the existence of withdrawal rights within corporate statutes in the region. However,
the OECD recommends the inclusion of a more precise definition
of the events triggering dissenters' rights and remedies. 150 In fact,
corporate statutes should be as clear as possible about the events
under which such remedies could be exercised. The OECD also
points out to the necessity of introducing mechanisms that allow
for proper appraisal of the shares held by stockholders exercising
dissenters' rights.
Another recommendation rendered by the OECD is aimed at
determining the role of stakeholders in corporate governance
issues. Such actions as ensuring conformity of corporate officers
with legislation related to the rights of stakeholders should be
taken. The paper also emphasizes in the need to encourage the
reporting of illegal or unethical behaviors by corporate officers to
the extent that they are in violation of stakeholders' rights.
149. The OECD takes into account that "exchange rules and company charter
documents have in practice failed to ensure equitable treatment of shareholders in
cases of 'squeeze outs', de-listings, and exercise by shareholders of statutory
withdrawal rights." Id.
150. For example, events such as a transformation of the corporation's business
purpose of the company, or a restructuring of its capital stock should allow for the
exercise of dissenter's remedies. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 18.
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As explained above, the organization has shown concern
about the necessity to enhance the quality and integrity of financial reporting as a means to improve disclosure and transparency."1 The White Paper suggests that the regulatory
framework concerning the financial reporting process should be
evaluated considering the potentiality for the emergence of conflicts of interests. In order to deal with this situation, the information relevant for the annual reports should be prepared and
verified on a timely basis, by means of implementing a division of
responsibilities among the company and taking into consideration
the auditing process. The organization insists on the importance
of a qualified and independent auditor as well as in the relevance
of abiding by international standards for the preparation of financial information.
The OECD is also concerned with the need of a legal framework that creates effective means to obtain accurate information
about beneficial ownership and control. This recommendation is
grounded upon the difficulty to identify controlling parties in corporations based in countries in which a concentrated ownership
structure prevails. These systems are propitious for potential conflicts of interest, related party and insider trading transactions.15 2
Ownership concentration may thus allow controlling shareholders
to undertake business transactions that may be detrimental to the
interests of minority shareholders.15 3 Hence, the OECD has recommended the use of a three-fold template that sets forth the following mechanisms aimed at identifying beneficial equity owners: (i)
up-front disclosure; (ii) imposition of an obligation to keep beneficial ownership and control information, and (iii) creation of a reliable information system. The organization further insists in the
151. According to Mierta Capaul, "[dlisclosure and transparency refer to the
availability, reliability, and timeliness of financial and non financial information to
all shareholders. This includes information on the governance structure of the
company, how corporate decisions are taken, and what checks and balances are in
place to ensure equitable treatment." Capaul, supra note 133, at 10.
152. Some countries have already adopted these protective measures. Capaul
informs that in Chile, for instance, shareholders holding at least five percent of the
outstanding shares may subject a related party transaction to an approval at an
extraordinary general meeting. Id. at 10.
153. In regards to the specific situation of Bolivia, Mierta Capaul holds that there is
"a widespread perception among Bolivians that the controllers of some 'capitalized
companies' understate profits or transfer them out of the company through related
party transactions or other means." Id. at 9. The same author further states that this
perception "has generated an intense debate on how the capitalized companies should
be governed to ensure that their activities are conducted in the best interest of the
company and all shareholders" Id.
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importance of allowing interested shareholders to identify all the
parties with whom controlling stockholders have a material business relationship.
The White Paper also contains extensive recommendations
regarding the duties of the board of directors. As it has already
been stressed out, equity ownership concentration in Latin
America allows controlling shareholders to exercise a dominant
influence over directors. Thus, the OECD deems necessary to foster a legal framework that compels members of the board to
strictly abide by their duties of care and loyalty, as a means to
protect the interests of all of a company's shareholders.' For this
purpose, the organization contends once again that minority
shareholders should be entitled to appoint board members. This
may be accomplished by the use of cumulative voting systems. 15
As it has already been explained, minority-appointed directors will generally lack a veto power on board decisions.' 56 Therefore, imposition of mandatory voting mechanisms such as the one
depicted before may fail to effectively protect the interest of
minority stockholders.' 57
As we have analyzed thus far, the OECD's focus appears to be
the substantive areas of corporate law that need to be amended in
154. In most jurisdiction in the Latin American region there is comprehensive
regulation not only on the duties of directors but also on the liabilities that are
imposed upon them. See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 590. The effectiveness of such
provisions is generally limited due to enforceability concerns.
155. By this method, each shareholder receives a proportionate number of votes to
their shareholdings, which at the same time are assigned to one or more candidates.
According to Bainbridge, "cumulative voting provides an alternative mechanism for
electing the board of direqtors that can assure board representation for the minority."
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 102, at 444. Nevertheless, most Latin American legal systems
have already adopted mandatory systems for the designation of directors. Such is the
case of Mexico. See WALTER F. PHILIPP, LA SOCIEDAD AN6NIMA MEXICANA 375 (3rd ed.
1994).
156. In fact, establishing compulsory board representation for minority
shareholders may have little or no positive effect on a given company's decisionmaking processes. It could also be held that excessive restrictions may hinder the
board's ability to perform. That would be the case, for instance, whenever excessive
supermajority requirements are provided under the corporate by-laws. Stephen
Zamora has held that "in setting a higher voting majority for certain decisions,
corporations should be careful not to hamstring the board from making the normal
decisions that are vital to the daily operations of the company." ZAMORA ET AL., supra
note 5, at 589.
157. Vermeulen worries that cumulative voting systems "may easily be eliminated
or minimised by the controlling shareholder. For instance, he or she may alter the
articles of association or remove the minority shareholders' director without cause
and replace him or her with a more congenial person." VERMEULEN, supra note 79, at
105.
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order for corporate governance to be successful in the region. This
approach seemingly disregards a simple fact that has been constantly reiterated in this article, that is, the comparative sufficiency of corporate law provisions dealing with minority
stockholders' rights. The OECD seems to overlook the significance
of enforceability, which appears to be the single most important
aspect to be improved in most -if not all- Latin American countries. As it will be analyzed below in further detail, the lack of
appropriate and effective judicial remedies, the general inefficiency of the judicial systems, and the time-consuming nature of
legal processes result in the uselessness of any positive consecration of substantive rules. The issue of enforceability of corporate
statutes is dealt with in further detail below.158
VII.

ENFORCEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES

A determining factor for poor corporate governance in this
region relates to the prevailing weakness of the legal infrastructure and, specifically, the comparative lack of enforceability.' 59
The extent to which the legal system functions in Latin American
countries is still a matter of debate.16 ° Generally, it can be
158. Within the OECD White Paper for Corporate Governance there is,
nevertheless, a brief reference to enforceability. The organization lists a number of
measures that should be implemented to this end, including: (i)removal of
contradictions between rules and laws relating to corporate governance; (ii) achieving
an optimal distribution of powers among local courts, supervisory authorities and
enforcement mechanisms; (iii) enhancing the political and financial independence of
regulatory and supervisory agencies; (iv) providing such agencies with ample powers
so as to investigate and solve cases in a manner that fosters public confidence in
enforcement and deters rule-breaking and (v)allowing supervisory agencies to appear
before courts to submit advisory opinions in shareholder-related cases. See WHITE
PAPER, supra note 36, at 30-32.
159. Some authors have held that in the specific context of corporate governance
"[elnforcement of laws is as crucial as their contents. In most countries, laws and
regulations are enforced in part by market regulators, in part by courts, and in part
by market participants themselves. All outside investors, be they large or small,
shareholders or creditors, need to have their rights protected." La Porta et. al., supra
note 63, at 5.
160. According to Thome, "[diespite recent reform efforts, the administration of
justice in Latin America to a large extent continues to be based on a bureaucratic
model; as such, it is hierarchically organized and retains a written process that
facilitates the internal control of the proceedings (and the judicial functionaries), but
strictly limits participation in the process by affected parties." Thome, supra note 4, at
705. Rosenn also shares this concern: "[it is quite common to discover that the
authorities charged with administering a particular body of law are unaware of
significant changes in the statutory or case law. Inertia, ignorance, and inability to
keep abreast of rapid-fire legal change frequently combine to produce substantial
differences between the formal norm and the law actually being applied." Keith
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acknowledged that there is a considerable disparity between the
degrees to which the official legal systems penetrate in rural areas
as compared to the same phenomenon in major urban centers.161
In the latter scenario an increasing development of legal institutions has allowed for the modernization of several economic
sectors.6 2
The literature has identified relevant substantive law factors
that affect corporate governance in Latin America. There is a consensus as to the main structural legal changes that could be made
in order for local corporations to be more competitive in a global
environment and to have a broader access to the international
capital markets. However, enough emphasis has not been placed
in the need to develop effective mechanisms for the enforceability
of corporate governance principles in the region.'63 A failure to
identify appropriate measures in order to effectuate a significant
turnaround in the traditional legal systems of Latin America has
caused corporate governance to lack usefulness that it has in
other parts of the world.
According to Bratton, empirical evidence demonstrates the
obvious premise whereby there is a strong correlation between the
Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass of the Formal Legal System and its
Developmental Implications, 19 Am.J. COMP. L. 514, 541 (1971). This rather extreme
vision of Latin America has been critiqued as unrealistic by Jorge L. Esquirol:
"Exoticizing these societies indeed characterizing them as somehow beholden to
different conceptions of the meaning of law, plays a large role." Jorge L. Esquirol,
Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 87 (2003).
161. Merryman points to the fact that to the urban oligarchy population, Western
Law is the significant legal standard as opposed to customary law, which is the law
for millions of marginal inhabitants in Latin America. JOHN H. MERRYMAN & DAVID S.
CLARK, COMPARATIVE LAW: WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS

365 (1978).
162. "A more developed commercial and financial law, with related changes in
property and procedural law, serve to build the framework for the expanding
economic activity [in Brazil]. Legal forms for aggregation of capital and skills, or for
the exertion of greater economic power, assume high significance." Henry J. Steiner,
Legal Education and Socio-Economic Change: BrazilianPerspectives, 19 AM. J. COMP.
L. 39, 47 (1971).
163. According to Berglof and Claessens, "[e]nforcement more than regulations,
laws-on-the books or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least
in transition and developing countries." Berglof, supra note 126, at 1. It must also be
noted that "a corporate law regime will not be effective if it is not enforced.
Shareholders rights are only meaningful to the extent they are protected. Simple
bright-line rules and greater transparency facilitate enforcement, but more is needed.
Rooting out corruption is essential to promoting the rule of law and is a precondition
to any effective legal system. The law must be crafted and enforced by honest-dealing
and competent judges, lawmakers, and regulators, and scores cannot be settled by
bribes, violence, and politics." Paredes, supra note 76, at 1154-1155.
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rule of law and the ability to enhance and deepen local capital
markets.'6 In other words, the few thick and liquid capital markets that exist in the world are characterized by legal investor
protection as opposed to thin markets lacking significant liquidity
in which shareholders are subject to less effective legal safeguards.165 This author also stresses out the obvious rationale that
underlies the assumption: "given a weak legal protection, only voting control will protect against expropriation by other equity
investors .,,1

Interestingly enough, Roe states that there are limits associated to the ability of corporate law to change ownership patterns.
Such boundaries are so clear that even in nations in which there is
a significant protection awarded to investors (i.e., Germany and
Scandinavian countries), there is no separation between ownership and control. This situation arises, according to Roe, from
"deeper features of society, such as industrial organization and
competition, politics, conditions of social regularity, or norms that
support shareholder value.... ,,s7

During decades, efforts have been constantly made in order to
improve the judicial system in the region. Although some signifi164. Keith Rosenn also holds that despite opinions to the contrary, it is
undoubtedly true that strengthening the rule of law will bear on the developmental
process and often in a positive way. See Keith Rosenn, Lectures on Latin American
Law, Chapter 2, University of Miami, 1992, at 110 (on file with author).
165. Authors such as Troy A. Paredes highlight the fact that "the law has a central
role to play in the development of equity markets. In short, the law is essential to
securing the property rights of shareholders. Strong legal protections shield
shareholders, especially minority shareholders, from having their investments
expropriated by insiders, including directors, officers, entrepreneurs, and controlling
shareholders.... By protecting shareholders from insider abuses, the law can instill
in shareholders the confidence needed to invest, thereby leading to thicker and more
highly valued equity markets." Paredes, supra note 76, at 1057.
166. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate
Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross-Reference, 38
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 229 n.48 (1999). Mark Roe also addresses this concern
pursuant to today's dominant academic explanation regarding the lack of deep
securities markets in Continental Europe, which is supposed to be linked to "the weak
role of corporate and securities law in protecting minority stockholders, a weakness
that is said to contrast with America's strong protection of minority stockholders."
Roe, supra note 112, at 236-37.
167. Id. at 239. Other authors like Jeffrey N. Gordon argue that corporate
governance convergence does not depend exclusively on an economic logic (which
assumes that legal systems will converge to best corporate practices), but on a
country's or group of countries' commitment of transnational economic and political
cooperation. JEFFREY N. GORDON, AN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE ON THE
CONVERGENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: GERMAN SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM AND
THE EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (ECGI) EUROPEAN UNION, 1990-

2000, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=374620.
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cant achievements have been accomplished, imbedded vicious
practices die hard in Latin American judiciaries. It can be anticipated that surpassing these obstacles will be a lengthy process to
which significant corporate governance improvements cannot be
subject to. Therefore, alternative avenues must be pursued. For
instance, the application of arbitration for corporate matters has
been regarded as a means to cope with the requirement for hasty
resolution for these conflicts. Among these solutions, the most
auspicious one appears to be the strengthening of administrative
agencies in charge of supervising Latin American corporations. As
it will be seen below, the specific characteristics of these entities
may enable them to solve corporate issues on a more technical and
swift manner.
Probably the lack of knowledge of the actual operation of
these entities and in some cases the misuse or their powers have
resulted in distrust towards their existence. In fact, governmental
control on corporations in Latin America has not been exempt
from constant criticism ever since these administrative agencies
were created. 68 "The requirement for prior government authoriza-

tion has met with constant opposition in all countries on diverse
grounds."'' 9 It has also been asserted that these agencies lack sufficient transparency to deal with corporate affairs. 170 Moreover, it
168. According to Guillermo Cabanellas de las Cuevas governmental control on
business corporations corresponds to historical reasons more than actual economic
concerns. This control does not exist in the majority of industrialized countries. 8
GUILLERMO

CABANELLAS

DE LAS

CUEVAS,

DERECHO

SOCIETARIO,

PARTE

GENERAL,

INTERVENCION Y FISCALIZACION ESTATAL DE SOCIEDADES 33 (Editorial Heliasta ed.,
2003). "Using a widespread ill conceived technique in Argentine law, corporate
statutes grant supervisory agencies overwhelming powers and a great deal of
discretionary authority to interfere in the creation and existence of corporate
organizations. In doing so, such agencies have been converted into a kind of
overpowering supervisory institutions, which may disregard subjective rights granted
upon shareholders." Id. at 12.
169. Eder, supra note 22, at 38. The author lists the following challenges to
government control of corporations: (i) it is an unconstitutional restriction on the
right of freedom of association; (ii) the supposed protection to the public is illusory;
(iii) the task is beyond the capacity of States with poorly organized civil services; (iv)
it is a hindrance to progress; (vi) it infringes on the constitutional separation of
powers; (vii) it is an obstacle to commerce without corresponding benefits; (viii)
tutelage by the law is better than tutelage by the government; (ix) judicial functions
should not be entrusted to the administration and (x) it is violative of principles of
economic liberalism. Id. at 38-39.
170. A rather cynical approach in regards to this same issue can be found in the
following excerpt: "There is general agreement that in several Latin American
nations, the government body charged with the supervision of companies has
extended its powers to ensuring that the statutory mandates be fulfilled to a degree
which tends to rigidify the S.A. (stock corporation) into an inflexible stereotype
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has been argued that conferring judicial functions upon administrative agencies is against the basic principles of democratic systems.17 ' The argument is grounded on the presumed lack of
independence of these agencies vis-A-vis the executive branch of
government.'72 It is said that the lack of autonomy of the agencies'
directors is evidenced in the fact that they are usually appointed
by Presidential7 Decree
and, therefore, subject to undesirable polit3
ical pressures.

However, it is acknowledged that these agencies have a
higher technical qualification and consequently a better understanding of complex corporate issues as compared to the average
Latin American judge.'74 In fact, in some countries of the region
there is a longstanding tradition of a kind of "administrative jurisprudence" rendered by these agencies.175 Furthermore, the degree
constantly subject to inspection from minor government officials not uncommonly

hungry for a mordida." Hannon, supra note 29, at 756.
171. Pursuant to Adolfo Rouillon, the Colombian Constitution determines that the
judges must remain independent from the executive branch of government.
"Nevertheless, the officers of the Superintendence of Corporations -that acts as a
judicial authority in bankruptcy proceedings- cannot guarantee an independence
equal to the one granted to the judiciary." ADOLFO ROUILLON, COLOMBIA: DERECHOS DE
CRPDITO Y PROCESOS CONCURSALES 46, http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/pls/portal30/
docs/PAGE/INTERNET/REGULACION/TAB698536/3_12.%2BCOLOMBIA%2BDER
ECHOS%2BDE%2BCREDITO%2BY%2BPROCESOS%2BCONCURSALES.PDF.
172. It has also been held that the effectiveness of this kind of entities is usually
linked to the person who is appointed to lead them. According to Guillermo
Cabanellas the Corporate Law of Argentina depends upon the premise whereby
undesirable incompetent individuals will not ever be in charge of institutions such as
the Inspection of Justice. "This is a dangerous premise, the worst consequences of
which we have been fortunate enough to avoid thus far." CABANELLAS DE

LAS CUEVAS,

supra note 168, at 12.
173. In accordance with Adolfo Rouillon, the Colombian Superintendent of
Corporations is appointed and removed by the President in a discretionary manner.
As a consequence, "the person empowered to decide on final adjudication of debtors
and creditors' rights within insolvency proceedings is politically appointed by the
Colombian President." ROUILLON, supra note 171, at 44-45. The author further
presents the following valid criticism: "There is no statute or regulation establishing
either objective criteria for the appointment and removal of the Superintendent of
Corporations or tenure for the officer to remain in charge of the agency during a
determined period of time." Id.
174. "Even countries with a career judiciary seldom attract the most able law
students, who find the gap between judicial salaries and the remuneration of private
practice too great. In many Latin American nations, these economic and legal-cultural
explanations for a low level of judicial independence are overshadowed by political
considerations." Rosenn, supra note 164, at 135.
175. "The rules enforced by the Superintendencia are for the most part cast in
reasonably,

precise

terms

.

.

.

. An

administrative

agency

such as

the

Superintendencia may contribute to legal development in several ways. It may act as
both an interested party and as a source of technical knowledge in the preparation of
new statutes and codes. It may also promulgate regulations within the scope of its
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of predictability, legal certainty and expeditiousness of this supervisory system is higher than the one that would exist in its
absence.176 As it has been stressed out, the basic argument against
the exercise of judicial powers by administrative agencies is their
lack of independence vis-A-vis the executive branches of government. 177 This assertion arises from a conception whereby there
must be a complete separation of powers. Nevertheless, modern
constitutional law embraces the notion of cooperation between the
executive and judicial branches. 178 Furthermore, the criticism also
arises from an idealized autonomy of the judiciary -intimately
linked with pure Montesquieu's theories- that in the Latin American area is still unrealistic. In the specific context of Latin
America there are extensive studies as to the evils of which the
local judicial system is plagued. Mirow holds that for the region
the twentieth century "has been a period of relative judicial weakness. Too often courts are seen as riddled with delays, black logs,
and bribes. The extreme extent to which the judiciary is dependent on the executive power has hindered the development of law,
and throughout the twentieth century even the supreme courts of
some Latin American countries have been summarily removed
and replaced by the executive or the military." '79 The same author
has held that the Latin American judiciary in the twentieth century continued to be politically subordinate to the executive to the
extent that, in practice, "judges often function at the mercy of the
executive."8 ° Rosenn further notes that no Latin American judicistatutory authority. Finally, its own decisions in individual cases may constitute an
administrative jurisprudence." Eder, supra note 22, at 284-285.
176. See, e.g., FRANcIsco REYES VILLAMIZAR, REFORMA AL RGIMEN DE SOCIEDADES Y

CONCuRsos 339 (2d ed.,1999)

(showing the rapid adjudication

in bankruptcy

proceedings filed before the Superintendence of Corporations between the years 1969
and 1997).
177. As a result of the Superintendent of Corporations' appointment by the
Colombian President, this officer in his capacity of adjudicator of rights, lacks
institutional independence vis-&-vis the executive branch of government.
Nevertheless, such independence -which constitutes a fundamental tenet of modem
democracy is granted by the Colombian Political Constitution to every judge as a
member of the judiciary. See Rouillon, supra note 171, at 45.
178. See, e.g., article 116 of the Colombian Constitution (allowing for the exercise of
judicial powers by administrative agencies, provided that an express authorization is
given by the legislator).
179. See MIROw, supra note 16, at 174.

180. Id. at 193. Matthew Mirow explains in further detail the basic causes of such
subordination, which are mainly of a financial and political nature. Id. Pursuant to
the opinion of Stephen Zamora "[tihe reasons for the endemic deficiency of Mexico's
judicial system lie in the country's unique and complex historical, ideological, cultural
and political traditions. Such traditions include the Spanish colonial practice of
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ary "enjoys the prestige, deference and independence of the judiciary in Anglo-American countries." 1
To be sure, most comparative law authors who have written
on Latin American legal systems point out to the notorious difference that exists between the law in the books and enforceability
by a judiciary that is generally considered to be neither proficient
nor independent. 8 2 Precluding administrative agencies from adjudicating complex corporate matters is tantamount to proposing a
denial of justice. In fact, apart from independency, corporate litigation requires expeditious and technical processes that can only
be achieved where highly qualified adjudicators are in place.
Diminishing the degree of independence could be justified to allow
for a more precise and timely enforceability of corporate law.
Thus, if administrative agencies such as the Argentine General
Inspection of Justice or the Colombian Superintendence of Companies were empowered with the enforcement of corporate governance provisions, due compliance with these statutes could
probably be ensured. As it will be explained below, the usefulness
of these institutions arises from their multi-functional nature as
well as from their ability to enforce rules and regulations. These
entities are not restrained to the cumbersome and lengthy proceedings to which judges are commonly subject. At the same time,
unifying executive, legislative, and judicial powers in a single organ, the Audiencia; a
history of dominance of public life by the political executive; and the powerful forces of
centralism that have shaped Mexico's legal landscapes. . . . Mexico's judicial
inadequacies were seen as products of several key shortcomings including a lack of
judicial independence." ZAMOPAk ET AL., supranote 5, at 187-88. According to David S.
Clark, the "audienciawas essentially a court of appeals with jurisdiction over roughly
the same territory governed by the viceroy or captain general. It served, in addition,
as a consultative counsel to the executive officials and had a limited degree of
legislative power." David S. Clark, Judicial Protection of Constitution in Latin
America, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 405, 408 (1975).
181. According to Nagle even Latin Americans tend to be distrustful of their own
businesses, banks and financial institutions, and of the government. "Their wariness
comes from long traditions of institutional corruption and unethical business
practices." Luz E. Nagle, E-Commerce in Latin America: Legal and Business
Challenges for Developing Enterprise, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 859, 907 (2001).
182. "Judges, police chiefs, and other local officials in Latin America are notoriously
underpaid and provided with inadequate working facilities; judges in smaller cities
are usually isolated from each other for months or years at a time - there are no
annual conferences of conventions; and finally, their tenure well may depend on
maintaining their local political contacts and friendships. Not surprisingly, then,
while adequate social and economic legislation (such as labor and water laws) is not
difficult to find in Latin America, in many cases it is ignored, inefficiently enforced, or
implemented in a manner that unduly favors a given element of society."
SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 15, at 988 (citing J.R. Thome, The Process of Land
Reform in Latin America, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 9, 20-21.
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their ability to issue regulations and to impose fines and other
administrative penalties allows them to exercise broad disciplinary actions on shareholders, directors, officers, and other stakeholders of a given corporation. These agencies, therefore, could
enforceability of corporate governplay a significant role in the 183
ance rules in the near future.
As anachronistic as it may appear, far-reaching powers
granted upon these administrative agencies are not necessarily
prejudicial to the economic activity. Under Comparative Law it is
recommended to analyze the specific economic, social and political
realities that underlie any given institution." Failing to do so
usually results in misleading analysis of a specific legal reality. In
the case of Latin American corporate law, such a reality is one of
discrepancy between the law in the texts and its actual application.185 This evident downside needs to be dealt with by confronting two competing views. First, the unrestricted defense of
the principle of judicial independence. Second, the undisputed
need for an expeditious adjudication in corporate litigation. It is
true that a harmonization between those two views would be an
ideal solution as it has been proven by more developed nations in
which corporate matters can be rapidly resolved by an independent judiciary.'8 6 Such an ideal solution is far beyond the realistic
possibilities of Latin America at least in the short run. An intermediate solution that corresponds to an accepted idea of cooperation between branches of government can and has proven useful
towards this end.
The experience accumulated over years of administrative
activity has determined the development of summary proceedings
for the enforcement of rules. The rulings contained in resolutions
and other decisions are usually reported in websites and pub183. In fact, the Colombian Financial Superintendence has created a division
entrusted with the enforceability of corporate governance as well as in corporations
issuing securities in the stock exchange (Decree 4327 of 2005).
184. Legal rules, institutions, or systems cannot be compared without knowing how
they function, and in order to do that, it is necessary to situate them "in their legal,
economic and cultural context." MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL
TRADITIONS 9 (St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1999).
185. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 15, at 987.
186. A major example of these characteristics is present in the jurisdiction of
Delaware in which the prestigious Court of Chancery is considered to be an effective
and independent system for the adjudication of corporate disputes. See STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 135, (The Foundation Press 2003). See also
ALAN PALMITER

&

FRANCISCO REYES VILLAMIZAR, ARBITRAJE

COMERCIAL Y OTROS

MECANISMOS DE RESOLUCION DE CONFLICTOS SOCIETARIOS EN EsTADos UNIDOS, BOGOTA,
CAMARA DE COMERCIO

79-80 (2000).
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lished in books that are broadly accessible to the general public." 7
The diffusion of these materials not only provides certainty as to
the authoritative interpretation of corporate statutes, but also
allows for predictability of the law. In a manner comparable to the
so-called no-action letters rendered by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the precedents rendered by these administrative agencies are "an alternative dispute resolution system." 8
Criticism based on the assumed old-fashioned nature of these
agencies and the argument whereby they are inconsistent with
modern corporate law, disregards the basic problem associated to
the region's legal systems. These entities have developed an
expertise on specialized fields of business law that has in many
cases contributed significantly to foster the rule of law.
A.

The General Inspection of Justice

One of the most significant institutions that has allowed for
the enforcement of corporate statutes in Argentina is the General
Inspection of Justice. This administrative agency -presently regulated under Law 22.315 of 1980- has been vested with a series of
powers that enable it to function as the leading enforcement institution in the province of Buenos Aires.189 Such prerogatives
include not only a permanent supervisory activity on closely held
corporations,' 90 but also a number of functions associated with the
187. The Superintendence of Companies has made available a large amount of
information at www.supersociedades.gov.co (last visited Feb. 17, 2008). There are also
a series of publications entitled Doctrinas y conceptos juridicos of the
Superintendence of Corporations that have been continuously published for more
than four decades. The General Inspection of Justice's resolutions are available at
www.infoleg.gov.ar (last visited Feb. 17, 2008). A number of publications carried out
by private publishers also report on several resolutions and other decisions rendered
by the Inspection. See, e.g., SILVANA MARTINEZ & RICARDo A. NISSEN, Nuevas
resoluciones de la Inspecci6n General de Justicia (2005).
188. See PALMITER ET AL., supra note 186, at 99-125.
189. Article 6 of Law 22.315, determines the various powers granted to the General
Inspection of Justice. The following important functions are included in such list: (i)
To request any information that it deems necessary to fulfill its purposes, (ii) to
undertake investigations and inspections, in which case it is entitled to request
information from any related party (iii) to file complaints against any given company
before any judicial or governmental authority, and (iv) to enforce its decisions by any
available means, including the request for police assistance.
190. Such powers allow the Inspection to undertake, among others, the following
measures: (i) Request information and documents from a corporation, (ii) initiate
investigations, (iii) receive and verify complaints against corporations, and (iv) void
any actions by means of administrative resolutions. See generally 4 GUILLERMO
Los Organos Societarios, in
GENERAL, 136 (Heliasta, 1993).
CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS,

DERECHO SOCIETARIO,

PARTE
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Argentine mercantile registry.19 ' In addition, the Inspection of
Justice is an important source of corporate doctrine in the area of
its jurisdiction, due to its thorough catalogue of resolutions and
other documents in which corporate law is analyzed. The latter
feature has led some authors to consider this agency's rulings as
one of Argentina's primary sources of regulation for corporate
governance. 192
The Inspection's wide-ranging powers to enforce corporate
regulations has also allowed the agency to issue regulations forcing offshore companies to subject themselves to Argentine corporate statutes (Law 19.550 of 1972 and other relevant
provisions).'93 This drastic remedy arose as a reaction to the
increasing number of companies that were incorporated outside
the country hiding behind the corporate cloak to circumvent
Argentine corporation laws.194 Indeed, by means of Resolution No.
IGJ-7 of 2003, the General Inspection of Justice determined that
any corporation that meets certain criteria is compelled to
undergo amendments of its by-laws in order to adjust them to Law
19.550.111 Reluctance to abide by these provisions may result in
191. See art. 4 of Law No. 22315, Oct. 31, 1980 (containing the powers that the
Inspection may exercise as keeper of the country's mercantile registry).
192. See generally Rodrigo Olivares Caminal, Corporate Governance Rules under
Argentine Law, 9 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 226 (2003).
193. The severe measures that the Inspection may undertake in regards to offshore
corporations have led some authors to challenge the agency's exercise of powers in
excess of those legally granted to it. See ALIcIA JOSEFINA STRATrA, LA REGULACI6N DE
LAS SOCIEDADEs

EXTRANJERAS POR LA INSPECCI6N GENERAL DE JUSTIclA 8

(Buenos

Aires, Universidad Cat6lica Argentina, 2004) (stressing that "personal opinions [of
the Inspection's stafl may not replace the legislator's will without severely affecting
legal certainty, the importance of which is undeniable for commercial affairs").
Nonetheless, other authors have underlined the advantages of having the means to
exercise control over the activity of companies incorporated outside of the Republic of
Argentina. See generally DANIEL ROQUE VITOLO, SOCIEDADES CONSTITUIDAS EN EL
EXTRANJERO 0

CON SEDE 0

PRINCIPAL OBJETO EN LA REPIUBLICA

95 (Buenos Aires,

Universidad Cat6lica Argentina, 2005) (concluding that article 8 of Law 22.315
provides sufficient powers to the Inspection of Justice to undertake a regulation on
foreign corporations); see also Carlos Molina Sandoval, Sociedades extranjeras: Se
acabo la fiesta!, in SOCIEDADES EXTRANJERAS 104 (Buenos Aires, Universidad Cat6lica
Argentina, 2004) ("The basis for Resolution 7/03 is both commendable and adjusted to
the current demands of mercantile activity because corporate practice showed that
several foreign companies with little or no activity in their state of incorporation were
registered to undertake business activities [in Argentina].").
194. Sandoval, supra note 193, at 103 (suggesting that one of the main reasons that
led to the adoption of such a drastic measure was the need to distinguish between
companies that actually carry out business transactions in foreign countries from
those incorporated abroad for the sole purpose of avoiding Argentine law).
195. These criteria are contained in Article 5 of Resolution No. IGJ-7 of 2003. Some
Argentine authors assert that whenever the General Inspection of Justice exercises

260

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:2

the corporation's delisting from the Argentine mercantile registry
196
as well as the initiation of compulsory liquidation proceedings.
The Inspection has also issued rules regarding the execution
of single or unrepeated acquisitions of real estate in Argentina by
offshore corporations."' Since foreign companies undertaking
these "isolated" transactions are generally not subject to Resolution No. IGJ-7 of 2003, such corporations were being used as straw
men to hold property located in Argentina. By means of such a
proceeding the actual individual owners were able to disguise
their identities, escaping legal actions that could be initiated
against them. This fraudulent use of corporate entities compelled
the Inspection of Justice to issue Resolution No. IGJ-8 of 2003 by
which the "Registry for the Isolated Activities of Foreign Corporations" was created.' The Registry lists all offshore companies
that have undertaken transactions concerning immovable property located in Argentina.'99 This measure is aimed at providing
the General Inspection with sufficient information to determine
whether a given corporation is being used as a mere holder of
property so as to avoid Argentine legal provisions. Should this be
the case, the Inspection would be entitled to force such corporation
to abide by the strict regulations set forth under Resolution No.
IGJ 7 of 2003, which as it has been already explained, relates to
corporations with permanent activities in Argentina. 00
It is also important to note that the General Inspection of Justice has issued significant regulation on matters that concern corthe powers contained in Resolution No. IGJ-7 of 2003, the following consequences
ensue: (i) The foreign company will have to meet local minimum shareholder plurality
rules, (ii) fulfillment of Argentine prerequisites for incorporation must be complied
with, (iii) the foreign entity will have to adopt one of the types of business associations
regulated under Law 19.550, and (iv) the requirements for such type of business
association will have to be met in their entirety. See VITOLO, supra note 193, at 80. It
is important to stress out that in 2005 the General Inspection of Justice compiled a
single regulation containing the contents of Resolution IGJ-7 of 2003 with a number
of dispersed rules regarding offshore corporations.
196. See art. 6 of Resolution No. IGJ-7 of 2003.
197. The General Inspection of Justice has also enforced regulations aimed at
preventing the misuse of the corporate form by foreign companies. For example, the
Inspection has compelled offshore corporations to undertake the acts provided for
under their purpose clause within the Argentine territory. Conversely, this has
resulted in a ban to set up branches that, due to their potential insolvency, may not be
able to satisfy their debts as they become due. See generally Resolution No. IGJ-1632
of 2003. See also MARTfNEZ, supra note 187, at 11.
198. MARTINEZ, supra note 187, at 10.
199. The information contained therein is provided to the Inspection by the
Argentine Registry for Real Estate Assets. See art. 1 of Resolution No. IGJ-8 of 2003.
200. See art. 4 of Resolution No. IGJ-8 of 2003.
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porate governance. For instance, it has addressed directors and
officers' liability for wrongful or negligent acts. In this regard,
Resolution No. IGJ-20 of 2004 -modified by Resolution No. IGJ-1
of 2005- mandated directors and officers to provide sufficient collateral to make up for any damages that may be inflicted upon the
corporation or its shareholders. °1 In addition, the Inspection has
dealt with issues regarding the relationship between shareholders
including, interalia, calling of meetings of the general assembly,0 2
rules regarding enforceability of shareholders' rights2 3 including
the inspection of books and records by shareholders,204 reduction of
legal capital, 2 5 as well as the winding up of corporations.2 6 In
regards to stakeholders' protection, the General Inspection has set
forth Resolutions concerning the prohibition to establish fictitious
domiciles for a given corporation,2 7 time limits for the payment of
subscribed shares 20 and minimum capital requirements.20 9
The Inspection's far-reaching activities have also allowed it to
uphold minority shareholders' rights in the context of specific
transactions. In a series of recent cases, the Inspection deterred
several corporations from excluding non-voting shareholders by
means of a proceeding know as the accordion maneuver (coup
d'accorddon). ° Should this practice had been allowed, it would
have resulted in the expropriation of non-voting shareholders by
majorities.2 1' For this reason, the Inspection precluded several
Argentine corporations from executing the accordion maneuver, in
201. This obligation had already been introduced in a general manner by article
256 of Law 19.550.
202. See Resolutions No. IGJ-258, IGJ-259 and IGJ-1556 of 2004.
203. See Resolution No. IGJ-1505 of 2003.
204. See Resolution No. IGJ-1257 of 2004.
205. See Resolutions No. IGJ-1328 and IGJ-1619 of 2003.
206. See Resolution No. IGJ-1619 of 2003.
207. See Resolution No. IGJ-12 of 2004.
208. See Resolution No. IGJ-24 of 2004.
209. See Resolution No. IGJ-9 of 2004.
210. The coup d' accord on is a complex operation most commonly used by
corporations in financial distress. See MAURICE COZIAN ET AL, DROIT DES SOCI9TIS 346
(Paris: Lexis-Nexis, 18th ed. 2005). The proceeding commences with the
shareholders' decision to reduce the corporation's subscribed paid-in capital to zero.
Subsequently the board causes the corporation to issue new shares of stock. As a
consequence, the company receives new resources from either stockholders or third
parties. In the last case, incumbent shareholders may be diluted due to a significant
reduction of their equity participation. They may also be altogether excluded from the
corporation. Id.
211. See generally MARTINEZ, supra note 187, at 17 (asserting that the accordion
maneuver would have allowed the concerned corporations to exclude non-voting
shareholders without proper consideration).
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spite of their adverse financial situation.212
The Resolutions and decisions rendered by the General
Inspection of Justice demonstrate the importance of administrative agencies in furthering the effectiveness of Latin American
corporate governance, particularly in cases in which corporations
of a large dimension are supervised.213 The same may be said of
the Colombian Superintendence of Companies.
B.

The Superintendence of Corporations

The Colombian Superintendence of Corporations is a second
example of the advantages of having an administrative agency
dealing with corporate law matters. For more than 65 years the
Superintendence has assumed uninterruptedly important supervisory activities regarding the governance of business corporations.214 The enactment of Law 58 of 1931 by which the
Superintendence was initially created was permeated by the idea
of protection concerning the interests of shareholders and other
stakeholders from potential abuses carried out in business corporations. The official comment written by the Congressmen who
prepared the draft legislation reads as follows: "The disrespect of
the corporate entity in our system is paradigmatic. We all have
numerous examples taken from real life to prove that it is a threat
against a person's equity to contribute our assets to a corporation.
This word is tantamount to loss, failure and fraud."215
212. See Resolutions No. IGJ-1471 and IGJ-851 of 2004; see also Resolution No.
IGJ-1452 of 2003.
213. See EFRAN H.

RICHARD

&

ORLANDO M.

MUINO,

DERECHO

SOCIETARIO:

SOCIEDADES COMERCIALES, CIVIL Y COOPERATIVA 576 (Astrea 2d ed., 1997) (explaining

that when the corporation reaches a certain size due to the importance of its capital
resources, the social-economic influence that it can exercise supersedes the individual
interest of equity owners and results in its permanent supervision by government in
order to ensure its compliance with applicable corporate statutes); see also ROBERTO
A.

MUGUILLO,

LEY

DE

SOCIEDADES

COMERCIALES:

LEY

19.550

COMENTADA

Y

CONCORDADA: NORMATIVA COMPLEMENTARIA 390 (LexisNexis, 2005) ("This supervisory
agency is not only empowered to verify the formal legality, but also to investigate the
substantial lawfulness of the incorporation and all additional transactions provided
for under the statute.").
214. "The Superintendencia possesses a broad mandate to supervise the creation

and operation of Colombian non-financial corporations. Its creation was attended by
sharp political controversy. The statute establishing it was enacted in 1931 over
government opposition, but the implementing decree was delayed until 1939. ..."
ROBERT

CHARLES

MEANS,

UNDERDEVELOPMENT

AND

THE DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATION LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY

COLOMBIA

OF

LAW:

283 (The

University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
215. The Congressional Commission in charge of reviewing the draft legislation
emphatically asserted that some "may find that there is an exaggerated intrusion of
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In a process to update the legal infrastructure of the Superintendence - undertaken in 1995 (Law 222) and 1998 (Law 446) the agency was vested with quasi-judicial powers to decide on litigation arising out of shareholders' conflicts. Such allocation of
judicial functions to administrative agencies corresponded to the
authorization granted under article 116 of the Colombian Constitution. By means of this provision the executive branch of government can assume certain judicial powers concerning non-criminal
matters. The statutes have applied this constitutional provision in
those cases in which non-judicial institutions have shown a particular expertise to offer rapid solutions in the adjudication of subjective rights. Pursuant to the official comment to the draft
legislation that resulted in the enactment of Law 446 of 1998,
"upon demanding justice, conflicting parties in an economic dispute may well find an appropriate response from the government.
The concept of 'judicial relevance' requires that the powers
granted to the judiciary be kept for adjudicating cases of a higher
social and legal importance. At the same time, access to a better
justice is also ensured."2 16 The official comment also made it clear
that at least at the time in which the draft legislation was prepared (1995), some of the remedies granted by the ordinary jurisdiction were illusory. This was due to the adverse equation arising
from a comparison between the matter in demand on one side, and
the cost and time required for the process in the other.
Among the specific processes that have been de-judicialized,
the following are particularly relevant:
a. Actions aimed at setting aside resolutions rendered by
shareholders' assemblies and boards of directors (See,
generally, article 133 of Law 446 of 1998);
b. Discrepancies arising from causes of dissolution (Id.,
Article 138);
c. Complaints regarding the appraisal of shares of stock
when there is a controversy between shareholders (Id.,
Articles 134-136);
d. Actions regarding the validity of transactions involving
the conveyance of shares of stock (Article 87 of Law 222
of 1995);
governmental powers in the supervision of corporations. We believe otherwise. Not
only do we find it justified, but we hold that it is indispensable ... " 1 FRANcisco
REYES, DERECHO SOCIETARIO 625 (Temis. 2d ed. 2006).
216. Eficiencia y Acceso en la Justicia, BOGOTA, MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DEL
DERECHO, Apr. 2005, at 112.
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e.

Actions to challenge the effectiveness of an issuance of
shares by a stock corporation (Id.);
f. All bankruptcy proceedings involving corporations and
other business entities (Article 90 of Law 222 of 1995
and Law 116 of 2006).

As it has been held, one of the Superintendence's major contributions to the interstitial development of Colombian corporate
law relates to the "administrative jurisprudence" that it has provided. In fact, reported "precedents", doctrinal opinions and noaction letters form an impressive body of law that is permanently
used as a point of reference to elucidate the meaning of corporate
law provisions. Such reporting of decisions and other relevant
materials supplies a large degree of predictability as to the outcome of the proceedings that are litigated before the Superintendence. Robert Charles Means recognized this fact when he
asserted that the Superintendence's "primary contribution to the
development of Colombian corporate law has been through its
jurisprudence."217 The Superintendence's "administrative jurisprudence" encompasses topics of the most different vein. The
entity has addressed issues such as voting procedures in the
shareholders' assembly,218 inspection of corporate books and
records,219 conversion of preferred and ordinary shares,2 2 ° preemp221
121th
tive rights, 22
as well
as the impossibility to revoke dividends.222
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The main literature produced on the subject of Latin American Corporate Governance throughout the past decade is still
descriptive in nature. Although most of the key issues and obstacles to introduce appropriate governance practices have been identified, the lack of a comparative law approach is evident in most
articles on the topic. The disregard of substantive and procedural
differences not only between the common law and the civil law,
but also among the various civil law countries in different regions
of the world has led to a general loss of perspective. Indeed, proper
methods of comparison demand extreme care regarding aspects
such as legal translation and transplants, including functional
217.
218.
219.
2001.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
See Opinion No. 220-18843 of April 19, 2002.
See Opinions No. 220-3036 of January 21, 2000 and No. 220-21510 of May 30,
See Opinion No. 220-74265 of December 30, 2000.
See Opinion No. 220-002951 of February 1, 2002.
See Opinion No. 220-72552 of November 30, 2000.
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equivalents and in-depth analysis of the manner in which the law
is created (judge-made or codified). Above all, special emphasis
must be placed in regards to the gap existing between law-in-thebooks and its practical application. A failure to apply such methodology unavoidably results in misleading approaches that fail to
address the main problems associated to legal transplants in the
field of Corporate Governance.
A comparative survey of the corporate laws existing in major
South American jurisdictions, provides a clear demonstration that
most Corporate Governance devices aimed at protecting the interests of minority shareholders against possible expropriation by
block-holders are already in place in Commercial and Corporate
statutes throughout the region. Only a fine-tuning of these
existing regulations in order to include more detailed substantial
provisions concerning self-dealing, independent directors and certain disclosure requirements will be needed to match international standards in this subject.
The main question that arises in the field of Corporate Governance and more generally in Latin American Corporate law is
not a new one. Scholars such as Phanor Eder in fact posed it
almost six decades ago and still today it relates to the reasons why
the minute regulation of minority shareholders' rights is largely
ineffective in the region. I cannot find a more straightforward
explanation than the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms
that correspond to weak legal infrastructures like the ones prevailing in the region.
The formidable obstacles that these countries will face in
order to effectuate a dramatic turnaround of their judiciaries will
result in a costly and time-consuming process. Such delays may
not be worthwhile at least in the field of corporate law, for the
reforms may come too late. While this process is accomplished, an
intermediate solution - which has proven to be efficient in some
Latin American countries - may be suggested. Certainly, the allocation of important supervisory, correctional and even judicial
powers to administrative agencies such as the Colombian Superintendence of Corporations, the Argentine Inspection of Justice or
the Chilean Superintendence of Securities and Insurance may
prove to be a last resort interim solution to the long-lasting and
ineffective judicial processes of Latin America. The technical
expertise of these agencies as well as the expeditious proceedings
they have developed during the last decades have been more useful in handling Corporate Law conflicts than the ordinary courts.
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Despite criticism regarding the role of these agencies, their existence is more than justified by the lack of a judiciary capable of
resolving complex commercial issues on a timely fashion.
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Annex A
Corporate governance legal provisions under major
South American systems
Country

Shareholdera' Assembly

Shares of
stock

Director, and
Officers

Directors
and
officers'
liability

Auditors

Disstnters'
Rights

Corporate
Distributions

Diiclosure

Venezuela
(Commercial Code
and Capital Markets Law)
References are
to the
Commercial Code,
unless
otherwise
indicated)

1. Summons
must be
made 5
days in
advance
(Arts. 277,
278, 281)
2. Voting
and Quorum provisions (Art
273)
3. Supermajority
requirements (Art.
280)

1. Ordinary
and preferential
shares may
be issued
(Art. 292)
2. No voting
stock may
be issued
(Art. 292)
3. One
share, one
vote rule is
not mandatory (Art.
292)

1. Elected by
the shareholdera' assembly
(Arts. 253,
275)
2. Cumulative
voting is not
mandatory
3. Voting
restrictions
(Art. 286)
4. Conflict of
interest regulation (Art.
269)

1. Joint
and several liability
(Art. 266)
2. Causes
for liability (Arts.
243, 244)

1. Comisaria
(Arts.
304-311)

1. Right
to withdraw
(Art. 282)

1. Minimum dividend distribution
requiremeats in
public
corporations
(Arts.
115, 116
of the
CML)
2. Share
Reacquisition
(Art. 263)

1. Right
to
examine
books and
records
(Art. 284)

Colombia
(Commercial Code,
Law 222
of 1995
and Law
964 of
2005)

1. Summons
must be
made 15
days in
advance
(Arts. Art
424, 419 C.
Co.)
2. Voting
and Quorum provisions (Art.
68 of Law
222)
3. Supermajority
requirements
(Arts. 155,
197, 388,
455 C. Co.
and 3 of
Law 222)

1. Ordinary
and preferential
shares may
be issued
(Arts. 381,
382 C. Co.)
2. Non-vating stock
may be
issued (Art.
61 of Law
222)
3. One
share, one
vote rule is
mandatory
(Art. 381 C.
Co.)
4. Voting
restrictions
were in
effect until
1995 (Art.
428 C. Co)

1. Elected by
the shareholdera' assembly
(Arts. 434,
436 C. Co.)
2. Cumulative
voting is mandatory (Art.
197 C. Cs);
public compaaies may use
other methods
if they
enhance
minority participation
(Art. 39 of
Law 964)
3. Voting
restrictions
(Art. 185 C.
Co.)
4. Fiduciary
duties and
conflict of
interest regulation (Art. 23
of Law 222)

1. Joint
and several liability
(Art. 200
C. Co)
2. Causes
for liability (Art.
200 C.
Cu)
3. Judicial
actions
(Art. 24 y
25 of Law
222)

1. Revisor
fiscal
(Arts.
203- 217
C. Cu)

1. Derecho de
retiro
(Arts. 1217 of Law
222)
2.
Appraisal
remedies
(Arts. 15,
16 of Law
222)

1. Minimum dividend
distribution
requirements
(Arts.
155, 454,
455 C.
Cu)
2. Share
Reacquisition
(Arts. 396
C. Co and
42 of law
964)

1. Right
to
examine
books and
records
(Art. 422
C. Co)

Ecuador
(Company
Law)

1. Summons
must be
made 8
days in
advance
(Art. 278)
2. Voting
and Quorum provisions (Arts.
279, 280,
283)
3. Supermajority
requirements (Art.
282)

1. Ordinary
and preferential
shares may
be issued
(Arts. 181,
183)
2. No voting
stock may
be issued
(Art. 183)
3. One
share, one
vote rule is
mandatory
(Art. 183)

1. Elected by
the shareholdera' assembly
(Art. 273,
275)
2. Cumulative
voting is not
mandatory
(Art. 299)
3. Voting
restrictions
(Art. 285)
4. Fiduciary
duties and
conflict of
interest regulation (Arts.
303-305)

1. Joint
and several liability
(Art. 297,
298)
2. Causes
for liability (Art.
298)
3. Judicial
actions
(Art. 314)
4. Conflict of
interest
regulation
(Art. 300)

1. Comisarios
(Art. 316)

1. Der.
echo de
retiro
(Art. 377)
2.
Appraisal
remedies
(Art. 377)

1. Minimum dividend
distribution
requirements
(Arts.
155, 454,
455)
2. Share
Reacquisition
(Art. 205)

1. Right
to
examine
books and
records
(Art. 290)
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Brazil
(Law No.
6404 of
1976, as
modified
by Law
No.
10.303 of
2001)

1. Summons
must be
made 8
days in
advance
(Art. 124)
2. Voting
and Quorum provisions (Art.
125, 129)
3. Supermajority
requirements (Art.
136)

1. Ordinary
and preferential
shares may
be issued
(Arts. 1517)
2. No par
stock may
be issued
(Art. 11)
3. One
share, one
vote rule is
mandatory
(Art. 110)
4. Voting
limitations
may be
established
(Art. 110)

1. Elected by
the shareholders' assembly
(Arts. 122,
132)
2. Cumulative
voting is mandatory in
some cases
(Art. 141)
3. Fiduciary
duties and
conflict of
interest regulation (Arts.
153-157)

1. Joint
and several liability
(Art. 158)
2. Causes
for liability (Art.
158)
3. Judicial
actions
(Art. 159)

1. Conselho Fiscal (Arts.
161-165)

1. Direito
de
Retirada
(Art. 136)
2.
Appraisal
remedies
(Art. 136)

1. Minimum dividend
distribution
requirements
(Art.202)
2. Share
Reacquisition
(Art.)

Chile
(Law
18.046 of
1981)

1. Summons
must be
made in 3
different
newspaper
ads (Art.
59).
2. Voting
and Quorum provisions
(Art. 61)
3. Supermajority
requirements (Art.
67)

1. Ordinary
and preferential
shares may
be issued
(Art. 20)
2. No voting
stock may
be issued
(Art. 21)
3. One
share, one
vote rule is
mandatory
(Art. 21)
4. Voting
limitations
may be
established
(Art. 21)

1. Elected by
the shareholders' assembly
(Art. 31)
2. Cumulative
voting is mandatory (Art.
66)
3. Fiduciary
duties and
conflict of
interest regulation (Arts.
42-44)

1. Joint
and several liability
(Arts. 45,
133)
2. Causes
for liability (Art.
45, 50,
89)

1. Inspectores de
cuentas
(Art. 51)
and/or
external
auditors
for public
corporations
(Art. 53)

1. Derecho de
retiro
(Arts. 69
his, 70)
2.
Appraisal
remedies
(Art. 69
bis)

1. Minimum dividend
distribution
requirements
(Art. 79)
2. Share
Reacquisition
(Art. 27)
3. Examining
books and
records
(Art. 54)
General
disclosure
art. 46

Argentina
(Law
19.550 of
1972 and
Decree
677 of
2001)
References are
to Law
19,550,
except
quoted
otherwise

1. Summons
must be
made 10
days in
advance
(Art. 237)
2. Voting
and quorum
previsions
(Art. 243,
244)
3. Supermajority
requirements (Art.
244)

1. Ordinary
and preferential
shares may
be issued
(Arts. 216,
217)
2. No voting
stock may
be issued
(Art. 217)
3. One
share, one
vote rule is
not mandatory (there
is a limit of
up to 5
votes per
share) (Art.
216)

1. Elected by
the shareholders' assembly
(Art. 255)
2. Cumulative
voting is mandatory (Art.
263)
3. Fiduciary
duties and
conflict of
interest regulation (Arts.
271-273)

1. Joint
and several liability
(Art. 200,
274)
2. Causes
for liability (Arts.
200-274)
3. Judicial
actions
(Art. 276279)

1.
Sindicos
(Arts.
284- 297),
and Consejo de
vigilancia
(Arts.
280, 281)
Comit6 de
auditoria
(auditing
committee)
formed by
3 directors
(required
only for
listed corporations
(Art. 15
Decree
677/01)

1. Derecho de
receso
(Art. 245)
2.
Appraisal
remedies
(Art. 245)

1. No
minimum
dividend
distribution
requirements
2. Share
Reacquisition
(Art. 220)

1. Right
to
examine
books and
records
(Art. 133)

1. No
direct
rights to
examine
books and
records
(only if
the corporation
has no
slndicos)
(Art. 284)

